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GUERRILLA & COUNTER- GUERRILLA WARFARE

Liberation and Suppression in the
Present Period



by **WILLIAM J. POMEROY**

About the Author

*William J. Pomeroy was born in a small town in up-state New York in 1916. During World War II he served in the Philippines with the U.S. Army as a historian attached to the Fifth Air Force. He then first came in contact with the Huks, a Filipino guerrilla force which fought the Japanese throughout the occupation, on the major island of Luzon. After the war he returned to the Philippines as a free-lance writer for the Manila press, and studied at the University of the Philippines, where he met and later married Celia Mariano. Together they joined the new Huk movement in 1952, in the field as teachers and writers. Captured by government forces in 1952, they were both sentenced to life imprisonment for "rebellion complexed with murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping." After serving ten years, when the Supreme Court had found there was no such crime on the statute books, they were pardoned and William Pomeroy was deported. Finally reunited with his wife in London, Pomeroy is at work on a full-length study of U.S.-Philippines relations. He is the author of *The Forest*, a book about his life with the Huks, published in New York in 1963, and of a volume of poetry *Beyond Barriers*, published in Manila the same year. He is also a newspaper correspondent and continues to contribute short stories, articles and essays to magazines in the Philippines, the United States and elsewhere.*

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

*The Forest: A Personal Record of the
Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines*

Guerrilla and Counter-

GUERRILLA WARFARE

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Why Guerrilla Warfare

To most people, war in the modern world is a matter of nuclear conflict, involving long-range guided missiles, hydrogen bombs, and all the push-button paraphernalia of modern weaponry. While it is true that the armaments programs of the United States and of other countries put their main emphasis on such weapons, the actual wars now being conducted by the United States and its allies are not nuclear wars or not even "conventional" wars as they are usually taught in the military schools. They come under the heading of "guerrilla" or "counter-guerrilla" wars, a type of conflict for which modern weapons systems are not designed.

For the past few years this is the type of war that has received major attention in the military training camps and in the military literature of the United States, France and Britain. Whole new branches have been created in the armies of these countries to specialize in guerrilla fighting and in how to cope with it. Extensive studies on guerrilla warfare have been financed by governmental agencies, both military and political, and have been widely cir-

culated to popularize the military policies associated with it.

This sudden and almost feverish interest by the policy makers of major countries in a form of warfare that has in the past been downgraded and looked at askance by their militarists is only in part a reaction to the success of popular guerrilla wars for freedom and independence that have been arising in remaining corners of the colonial system. Such a program is obviously designed to be used as a part of cold war activities and in the carrying out of policies of suppression and subversion abroad. The principal intention is to equip forces of suppression and intervention with a "mastery" of this form of struggle for counter-revolutionary purposes. At the same time it is hoped to generate support in the home countries for suppressive policies abroad directed toward preventing the final collapse of colonialism and toward retaining a disguised form of imperialist control over countries struggling to be independent.

Imperialism today, its war machines faced by the powerful weapons systems of the socialist countries, is unable to resort to the traditional method of resolving its critical problems—through large-scale aggressive war. However, it still uses military means to try to prevent the complete crumbling away of the colonial system. The United States, especially,

has been bent on the use of armed force to recreate for itself a new world position at the expense of the colonial peoples and so-called underdeveloped nations. Having based its military establishment on thermonuclear bombs and guided missile systems, which have been gradually cancelled out by the similar systems of socialist countries, it has now sought to evolve a theory of "limited" or "brush fire" wars to carry out its policies. Wars of this type are carried on in the underdeveloped parts of the world and are directed against the liberation movements that seek to gain independence for their people from imperialist control.

The situation of today's imperialists has been said to have its analogy in the classic military problem of an army that has its main forces pinned down at the center (by the power of the socialist countries) while its position is being caved in by flank attacks (from the upsurge of the colonial areas for freedom). Essentially, however, the situation of imperialism in the world today is not a military problem, however much it seeks to picture it and to treat it as such. The pressures that it now feels from all sides come from the economic and political contradictions in the organization of its system that have made life unbearable for hundreds of millions of people and that have driven them to take revolutionary paths to freedom. It is only in its advanced stage that

this becomes a military problem, and to treat it wholly as a military problem, which is the tendency, is for the imperialists to obscure the causes of revolt, and, inevitably, to stimulate an even more determined revolutionary effort by the people concerned.

The use of armed revolutionary struggle by people striving for independence, for freedom from tyranny, or for national liberation has been an important part of historical development. The use of guerrilla warfare has very frequently been a feature of such armed struggle. At no time in history, however, in any revolutionary period, have armed methods been the only or the preferred means to bring about change and liberation. The forces demanding change and freedom have invariably preferred peaceful means for correcting economic and political inequalities. Only when the possibilities of using them have been exhausted have they taken up arms with reluctance, usually after being provoked into it.

Forms of Revolutionary Struggle

The present historical period, to a greater extent than any in the past, is making it increasingly possible for oppressed peoples to emerge into freedom in a variety of ways, of which armed revolutionary struggle is but one.

This is due to the fact that the main world forces for liberation, represented by the socialist countries and their allies, have achieved substantially the balance of power in world relations. They are in a position to thwart imperialist plans for a major war of aggression, and are actively rallying the peoples of all countries for peace and for an end to intervention in the affairs of other countries.

Thus in a score of countries in Asia and Africa—India, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, for example—the people and their leaders have been able to maneuver for freedom without an armed struggle becoming necessary in their particular cases. (Major struggles and bitterly sharp struggles will still be necessary in such countries in order to shake off the neo-colonial efforts of imperialism to reimpose its control in more subtle fashions, and in order to guarantee that these countries will develop toward socialism, but armed control or armed intervention by imperialism have been removed from these countries.) In British Guiana (renamed Guyana by its people), for another example, parliamentary means and negotiations have long been the chosen course, howsoever slow and tortuous it has proven to be.

In this respect, the present historical period, which is one of general transition from capitalism to socialism and of the breaking up of the colonial system of imperialism, is capable, as

time goes on, of proving somewhat different from the preceding great historical change from feudalism to capitalism. The latter was marked by waves of armed revolutions, civil wars, and national wars, conducted by the rising capitalist class to attain power. In the present period, the forces for socialism aim for a classless society without war, and seek to prevent the ruling capitalists from turning to the reactionary weapon of violence to maintain themselves and their system. The frustration of the war plans and the military programs of world reaction is an integral part of the strategy and tactics of the movement for socialism.

This feature of the great transition from one social system to another that is going on at present in the world contributes to the many forms of revolutionary struggle that are possible to exist side by side today: political, economic, ideological, parliamentary, non-violent resistance, mass demonstration, general strike, as well as wars for national liberation. While each form of struggle is shaped by the historical conditions and by the class relationships and alliances within a country, it is also molded by the relationships of the major capitalist and socialist countries internationally.

Anti-imperialist, anti-feudalist forces can be victorious with a minimum of armed struggle in Zanzibar because sympathetic independent anti-colonial countries in Africa are its close

neighbors and because powerful socialist countries that support it are a guaranty against armed imperialist intervention. Cuba can more or less peacefully proceed to socialism after its revolution because of its allies among the anti-imperialist masses of Latin America and because of its socialist allies. The successes of the non-violent and of the militant struggles of the Negro people in the United States are immeasurably aided by the struggles of the African, Asian and Latin American peoples for their own freedom.

Prevention of Peaceful Means

Imperialists of the United States, on the other hand, have resorted to every means to prevent a peaceful development from colonialism to a full independence for the peoples affected by it. In Guatemala, where in 1950 anti-imperialist forces gained power through a peaceful parliamentary victory, armed intervention in 1954, frankly organized by the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. State Department, overthrew the independent government. Huge amounts of American military aid, supplemented by American military "advisory" teams, is the only factor that holds up innumerable puppet regimes around the world that use armed force to deny popular liberties.

Since the early part of 1960 the United

States, through the CIA and its trained "guerillas," has been trying day and night to overthrow the independent government of the Cuban people by means of armed subversion. That Cuba has survived so long, without meeting a full-scale war of aggression as did Guatemala, is due to the tactics of the forces of liberation, of socialism and of peace everywhere. On the other hand, that there is no real peace in the Caribbean or in many neighboring Latin American countries is due to the program of intervention carried on by imperialist interests in that area.

The occurrence of armed revolutionary struggle throughout this present period in many sectors of the world, in its guerrilla form or in other forms, can be traced in every case to a denial by imperialists or by pro-imperialist governments of peaceful means for the masses of people to gain national aims, including direct armed intervention to reverse a popular trend toward independence.

Popular armed struggle has had its origin in the outlawing of trade unions and peasant unions that have sought to gain for workers and peasants a greater share of the super-profits that imperialists extract from their labor. It has resulted from the suppression of nationalist political parties that have advocated full independence and control over the natural resources of their own countries, including the

arrest, the torture or the killing of those who have protested peacefully against such denials and the use of force against the people and their legally constituted organizations.

When the people, with no other alternative, have fought back, using violence against violence, the advocates of military suppression and of counter-revolutionary warfare have sought to isolate these situations as purely military problems, covering up the economic, political and social origins with a screen of anti-Communist propaganda, raising the issue of "peace and order" piously. Such policies act, in turn, as further justification for armaments programs, for curbing of popular liberties, and for entrenchment of reaction in the home country.

An attempt is being made, under the theory of "limited" warfare, to continue such policies into the thermonuclear age and into the period of advanced disintegration of the colonialist system. As events involving Cuba have shown, and as was previously shown in the case of Korea, this is a dangerous theory. The complexities of international relationships do not allow limits to be circumscribed on any war of aggression today. Any imperialist aggression is too apt today to cling upon the shield of protection afforded by socialist countries and by anti-imperialist movements elsewhere.

Guerrilla warfare, it is true, has had a

greatly expanded popular application in the present period. It has proven to be the most effective means for an initially unarmed people to struggle against suppression by the modern military machines of imperialist countries. It is a form of struggle, too, that is fitted to large underdeveloped areas, where advanced mechanized equipment can be least advantageously used. Furthermore, it is a form of struggle that can be drawn out in a long war of attrition that is extremely costly for the suppressor country. (It is the high cost of suppression in the long run that proves the bankruptcy of such policies, in terms that the monopolists of imperialism can be compelled to realize, a cost far in excess of the losses and expenditures involved in peaceful settlements of people's needs in areas where these struggles take place.)

Popular guerrilla warfare today, as a form of revolutionary struggle, has its distinct features that differentiate it from the guerrilla warfare that has occurred in other periods of history or has been made use of by other class forces. Its highly organized but democratic character is derived from the forces of socialism that frequently guide it. Its very broad mass base is due to the revolutionizing of all but a tiny fraction of the people in a colonial area, where the population in general, except for a few allies of imperialism who profit from the colonial relationship, feel the weight of

foreign domination. Furthermore, today's popular guerrilla warfare does not occur in isolation, but enjoys the support of anti-imperialist populations everywhere, and is inseparably linked with the widespread movement for peace and democratic freedom in all countries.

Guerrilla Warfare in American History

As the leaders of the so-called "free world," U.S. imperialists have assumed the main role in the suppression of liberation movements on a world scale. They seek to use guerrilla warfare for their own ends—not only to fight existing liberation movements but also to destroy the independent regimes of those peoples who have already succeeded in setting themselves free, as in Cuba.

To facilitate such a program, imperialist policymakers are seeking to distort the material of American history itself to give a "military heritage" to the suppressive "special forces" units that are being recruited and trained in the U.S. Army today. Imperialist suppression is conducted under the guise of anti-Communism, but experiences of the American people in the Revolutionary War, in the Civil War, and in the latter-day wars from the turn of the century are being drawn upon to give a legitimate veneer to the anti-Communist indoctrination of an army of counter-revolution.

There are three distinct periods of American experience with guerrilla warfare. Each de-

serves to be examined for its bearing on contemporary policy.

The War of Independence

The first occurred in the Revolutionary War, the American War of Independence, 1775–1783. The American Revolution was, in truth, a close parallel to the wars of national liberation that have erupted in the colonial and semi-colonial regions of the present, and the parallel extends to the military tactics and the forms of struggle used.

This war is a source of embarrassment to the American imperialists today, because colonial peoples in revolt use it as an example to be followed. For instance, one of the first military references reportedly used by Chu Teh and his fellow officers in the early days of the Chinese Red Army was a manual on the tactics of General George Washington, which were the tactics of a colonial war of liberation supplemented by guerrilla warfare.

From the outset the Revolutionary War was fought in a half-partisan fashion, beginning with the guerrilla-style harassment of the British regulars in their withdrawal from Lexington and Concord back to Boston. Mao Tse-Tung, in his concept of transition from war of movement to war of position and even in his

uses of the spaces of China, had for a forerunner General Washington, who shifted from war of position around New York to war of movement in the inland spaces of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, then back to war of position in the Yorktown campaign, wearing down the British power.

In the Southern colonies, where the terrain was rough, wooded and swampy, the fighting passed from positional war to a war almost totally of a partisan nature, conducted by Francis Marion (the Swamp Fox, one of the great heroes of guerrilla warfare), Thomas Sumter, William Richardson Davie, Light Horse Harry Lee, Pickens, Hardin, Morgan, Davidson, men of the frontier who had learned tactics partially from the Indian, a natural guerrilla fighter. The populace of the region hid them and provided them with a vast intelligence network.

The war in the South had even sharper revolutionary features that were combined with the guerrilla tactics. Committees of Safety used methods of terror against the Tories—the sympathizers and collaborators with the British—burned their homes, tarred and feathered them, drove them out of the country, even mutilated and imprisoned them, and confiscated their property for the use of the revolutionary forces.

The contemporary wars of national liberation in Algeria, in Vietnam, in Cuba, have differed, if at all, only in degree from this, while

their patterns of struggle have been the same as those resorted to by Americans one hundred and ninety years ago. Yet the imperialists of today, seeking to use the form without the substance of American guerrilla experience, would use the spirit of Francis Marion to kill or suppress Vietnamese and Cuban fighters for independence.

This was a period of the revolutionary use of guerrilla warfare by Americans.

The Civil War

The second instance in which guerrilla warfare played a role in American history was in the Civil War of 1861–1865. Here it occurred in a wholly different setting that was in no sense revolutionary. The partisan bands of the Civil War were found almost entirely on the side of the Confederacy, where they were organized as adjuncts of the regular armies, usually for irregular cavalry raids. It is significant that Joseph Weydemeyer, the comrade and collaborator of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, who became a general in the Union army, was for a time in charge of *anti-guerrilla* operations in eastern Missouri. Weydemeyer fully understood, as did Marx and Engels, that the revolutionary banners in the Civil War were borne by the anti-slavery, anti-feudal ranks of

the Union which was conducting a just war, and that the military forces of the Confederacy, regular or irregular, were defending an outworn and reactionary system.

Southern planters feared and complained about their own partisans—the Mosbys, the Ashbys, the Forrests, and the guerrilla tacticians like Sterling Price—for their indiscriminate raiding practices. The Confederate Congress and President Jefferson Davis had authorized the formation of partisan bands on April 21, 1862. Continual complaints from civilians and from regular army alike, endorsed finally by General Robert E. Lee, led to the repeal of this authorization on February 17, 1864. Without a revolutionary aim or without the revolutionary participation of the masses, this form of guerrilla activity, as in similar cases in other countries, had soon degenerated into brigandage.

Of more significance than the unpopular nature of partisan bands on a limited scale by the Confederacy (which was the invaded area throughout most of the war) was the failure of widespread popular resistance to develop against occupation by the Union armies. Engels, who together with Marx closely followed the course of the American Civil War and who wrote analyses of its progress, noted this fact early in the war, in 1862, when the Union forces seized and occupied New Orleans, in

the heart of the Confederacy, and were harassed by no more than the burning of some bales of cotton on the Mississippi levee:

"... On a single battle, then, now hangs the fate of the Confederate armies [the Seven Days' Battle then impending in Virginia]; it remains to examine the chances of guerrilla warfare. Now in respect of precisely the present war, it is most amazing how slight, or, much rather, how wholly lacking is the participation of the population in it. In 1813, indeed, the communications of the French were continuously interrupted and cut up by Columb, Lützow, Chernyshev, and twenty other insurgent and Cossack leaders; in 1812 the population of Russia disappeared completely from the French line of march; in 1814 the French peasants armed themselves and slew the patrols and stragglers of the Allies. But here nothing happens at all. Men resign themselves to *the fate of the big battles*, and console themselves with *victrix causa deis*, etc. The tall talk of war to the knife dissolves into mere muck. And shall guerrillas come forth on the terrain? I certainly expect that after the dissolution of the armies the white trash of the South will attempt something of the sort, but I am too firmly convinced of the bourgeois nature of the planters to doubt for a moment that this will make them rabid Union men forthwith . . . and the planters will everywhere receive

the Yankees with open arms." (K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Civil War in the United States*, International Publishers, 1934, pp. 244-45.)

Significantly, the only guerrilla-type activity that did emerge after the dissolution of the armies was that of the Ku Klux Klan, the counter-revolutionary organization of the planters that was set up to suppress the Negro-poor white alliance that sought to bring democracy to the South in the Reconstruction period. (The Negro militias that arose during this period were defensive, to make possible the use of the ballot and other civil rights against their illegal denial by the KKK and other similar bands.)

Engels' observations on the lack of popular guerrilla warfare in the South during the Civil War were borne out more fully when Sherman cut loose from his base and marched through the very middle of the Confederacy in 1864 without drawing more than a skirmish from half-hearted militia. Determined guerrilla forces could have turned Sherman's daring campaign into a disaster, but nowhere did they materialize.

This was due mainly to the fact that the predominant class forces in the Confederacy and their aims in the war were reactionary and counter-revolutionary. The class known as "poor whites," the landless and the small freeholders, who have made the most tenacious of

guerrilla fighters in other periods of history, deserted heavily from the Confederate armies, into which they had been conscripted.

These deserters, having nothing in common with the big feudal planters who started and led the war, were in such large numbers that one band of 8,000 to 10,000 defied Confederate authority from the mountains of Alabama. Others in Georgia were so numerous and defiant that the state governor issued an alarmist proclamation about an insurrectionary situation. In the western mountains of North Carolina deserters seized and held towns, shot officers, and called on forces sent against them to lay down their arms.

The very elements that might have been counted on to conduct guerrilla warfare against an invader rebelled instead against the government of slave-owning planters. The latter were in even less of a position for a guerrilla struggle when Lincoln spread the embers of a more deep-seated revolution across the South with his Emancipation Proclamation for the abolition of slavery.

This period of American history should be studied more closely by the policy makers of "guerrilla" and "anti-guerrilla" operations in the United States today. It happened that there *were* elements in the Confederacy who *wanted* to conduct a prolonged partisan-style war against the Union even after the defeat of

the main Confederate armies. General Beauregard called vainly for guerrilla war against Sherman's march. More significant, recent studies indicate that at the end of the war the Confederacy still had a plentiful supply of war materials and of foodstuffs, still had 200,000 men under arms, and was otherwise in a favorable position for conducting a protracted guerrilla struggle. Furthermore, this was actually proposed in late 1864 by General Mosby in Virginia, favored by General Kirby Smith in the Trans-Mississippi area (the last general to surrender), and had the approval of President Davis himself. The failure to carry out such plans had but one important cause: the unwillingness of the people to join in them, the lack of popular support for a struggle in which the masses of the population had no stake.

This is the lesson from American history which imperialist interventionists and their "special forces" today overlook or ignore. Schemes of carrying "guerrilla war" into Cuba, into North Vietnam, into China, or into any socialist country have no more hope or basis of popular support than did the plans of the Confederate leaders.

The Imperialist Era

The third period of American experience with guerrilla warfare extends from the post-Civil War period down to the present. This

period and its military policies cannot be understood except in relation to its basic feature: the expansion of monopoly capitalism, first at home and then abroad as an imperialist system, an expansion typified by the subjugation and the dominance of other peoples for the purpose of exploitation. As such, it has brought the American experience with armed revolutionary struggle to a full turning of an historical cycle, from the use of such struggle by Americans to gain their freedom to the suppression of it to prevent freedom for others.

A background to imperialist expansion can be traced in the expansionist moves of American conquest of the continent. The Mexican War had this aggressive character. It was more apparent, however, in the Indian Wars, which were wars of suppression and of extermination of nations. The treatment of Indians from the seventeenth century onward became increasingly ruthless. They were driven from their lands or slaughtered first in the East, then in the Northwest Territory, then in the South. On the western plains and in the western mountains they made their final stand in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

In earlier periods the conquest and suppression had to a large extent been carried out by the volunteer militia of settlers, and the United States had formally entered into negotiations and land treaties with the Indians, but in the final stage of Indian subjugation

it was considered almost totally a military problem that was put in the hands of the regular army.

The Indians, continually pressed and squeezed, fought back usually with a form of guerrilla tactics. The Indian guerrilla, however, was not recognized as a legitimate soldier, and his extermination was extended as well to his women and children. This was the school of tactics for most of the general officers who later manned the outposts of empire in the American colonial and semi-colonial system—Wood, Chaffee, Lawton, Miles, Arthur MacArthur, Pershing.*

The ruthlessness with which the western land problems were settled was only the forerunner of more basic changes in American national policies which affected the freedom of peoples. This was demonstrated in the conquest of the Philippines, seized from Spain in the imperialist war of plunder known as the Spanish-American War of 1898.

The Fil-American War that resulted is one of the buried pages of American history. It was the first major case of the use of American

* U.S. Secretary of War Elihu Root addressed the U.S. Army troops as follows upon official termination of the Fil-American War, on July 4, 1902: "Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars, it [the army] has relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and jungle and crushed them."

troops and resources to suppress a people striving for independence and national liberation. The Filipino people refused to accept a new American master in place of the old Spanish one and conducted a war for freedom that was advanced for its time. They first tried to stand up frontally to the modern army of the United States and then carried on a guerilla war that lasted intermittently from 1899 to 1906.

Today the crushing of the First Philippine Republic is held up by imperialist tacticians (such as Roger Hilsman, Jr., late of the U.S. Department of State) as a model of suppression techniques. Its pattern of operation was in essence no different from that subsequently employed in Vietnam, in Algeria, in Malaya, in the Philippines again, and elsewhere, by American, British and French imperialists in the present period.

The First Philippine Republic was crushed by martial law under which civil liberties were obliterated, by reconcentration of populations, torture and abuse of civilians and of captured guerrillas, burning of habitations, destruction of crops, ruthless extermination of resistance. Instead of recognizing partisans as legitimate soldiers, the practice frequently was not to take prisoners, with casualty rates among Filipinos five killed to every one wounded (the opposite of normal casualty trends). Officially, over

200,000 Filipinos died in the process. It was in this war that the American General Jake Smith directed that the island of Samar be turned into "a howling wilderness," telling his men that "I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn; the more you burn and kill the better it will please me."

From the standpoint of the Filipino people, theirs was a revolutionary struggle for freedom that was no different in aim from that waged by the American colonies in 1775-1783. The extent of unity of the Filipinos against American occupation is revealed in the reports of the American generals commanding the anti-guerrilla campaign, such as those of General Arthur MacArthur:*

"... Most of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent municipal governments, to proceed simultaneously and in the same sphere as the American governments and in many instances through the same personnel—that is to say, the *presidentes* and town officials acted openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly in behalf of the insurgents, and, paradoxical as it may seem, with considerable apparent solicitude for the interests of both. In all matters touching the peace of the town, the regulation of markets, the primitive work pos-

* Father of General Douglas MacArthur, who began the suppression of the Huk national liberation movement in the Philippines after World War II.

sible on roads, streets and bridges, and the institution of schools, their open activity was commendable; at the same time they were exacting and collecting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the Filipino forces, and sending all obtainable military information to the Filipino leaders. Wherever, throughout the archipelago, there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact beyond dispute that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities; and not only so in the sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerrillas, but as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio [village], a movement quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a peaceful native.

"The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion. Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united

and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. One traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex organization. It is more probable that the adhesive principle comes from the ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership." (*U.S. War Department Report*, 1900, Vol. I, Pt. 5.)

The suppression in blood, by American troops, of this form of almost total resistance of a people who desired independence (which is duplicated in every popular guerrilla struggle today), is not an isolated episode. It is a feature, and today the most characteristic feature, of a foreign and a military policy in the service of imperialism.

A few years after the occupation of the Philippines, this repressive policy made its appearance again in Mexico in 1914, when General John Pershing (who won his spurs repressing Indians, and then Filipino Mohammedans in Mindanao) invaded that country to suppress the Mexican revolutionary guerrilla leader, Pancho Villa. The same policy was put into operation in Haiti in 1917, and was repeated in Nicaragua in the latter 1920's and early 1930's in an effort to suppress the popular guerrilla forces of Sandino, who resisted the U.S. Marines sent to bodyguard the United Fruit Company and American mining interests in that country.

Even during World War II, when widespread guerrilla warfare was employed in many countries against German and Japanese invaders, official U.S. forces played a counter-revolutionary role when they came in contact with such guerrillas. Thus, in the Japanese-occupied Philippines, American-led and American-advised Filipino guerrillas conducted a "lie-low" policy until the U.S. Army arrived, opposed organizing Filipinos to fight an all-out struggle against the Japanese. Instead they warred upon and tried to suppress the Huk-balahap, the Communist-led mass guerrilla movement in the Philippines, at times co-operating with the Japanese army to do so. This was done to prevent the growth of forces that might oppose imperialist control of the Philippines after the war, and it was the germ of the suppression policy that did take place in that country following the war.

The early experiences of American armed forces in suppressing popular struggles in other countries have been but a prelude to the worldwide policy following World War II. The imperialist system, whether American, British, French, Dutch or Portuguese, has sunk further into a general crisis that leads it into desperate efforts to prevent its collapse. It tries to intensify exploitation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples precisely at the time when they have been attracted by the example of the great national liberation struggles during

and after World War II. In the minds of the imperialists the great upsurge of popular struggles for freedom can only be met by turning modern war machines into enormous police forces, replete with Gestapo-type organizations and saboteur units. The campaigns of suppression in Vietnam, in Malaya, in Algeria, in the Philippines, in Cyprus, in Kenya, in Angola, have, indeed, been termed "police actions."

The United States soldier today is being used as the policeman of a world in revolt for freedom—the exact opposite of the partisan fighter who followed Francis Marion.

The U.S. Counter-Insurgency Program

American military advisors and American arms aid programs have played a major role in the suppression or attempted suppression of popular freedom struggles in the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Greece, Congo, Venezuela, Laos and other areas in the period after World War II. The Truman Doctrine of suppression in Greece, continued by the interventions of the Eisenhower administration in Guatemala, Asia and the Middle East, was intensified and expanded by the Kennedy administration, and is maintained by the administration of President Johnson. Since 1961, in particular, the U.S. armed forces have been increasingly readied and employed against national liberation movements.

U.S. "Special Forces"

Following the advice of General Maxwell Taylor, the foremost theoretician of "limited warfare," the late President Kennedy told Congress early in 1961 that "special forces and unconventional forces" would be increased

and their training stepped up. The Secretary of Defense at the same time called for an increase of 150 per cent in "anti-guerrilla forces." By 1963 these forces had actually increased by six times. A new post of Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Special Warfare, headed by General William B. Rossen, was set up by the Defense Department, while in the State Department a directorate of Intelligence and Research was established, the major purpose of which was the development of methods of "counter-insurgency." Added to this, in the Defense Department, was another Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

The new emphasis received immediate implementation. In 1961 the following U.S. Army Field Manuals appeared or were expanded, all concerned with the creation of "special forces" and their activities—FM 31-20: *Special Operations—Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*; FM 31-21: *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Operations*; FM 31-15: *Operations Against Irregular Forces*; FM 100-1: *Doctrinal Guidance*; FM 41-10: *Civil Affairs Operations*.

On July 4, 1962, President Kennedy, speaking to members of the Foreign Service Institute, which reportedly coordinates American diplomatic, foreign aid and intelligence work, said: "As thermonuclear weapons get higher and higher in the megaton range, and as there be-

comes less and less occasion to use them, then, of course, there will be more and more emphasis on this kind of struggle [guerrilla and subversive warfare]." On another occasion he said: "We possess weapons of tremendous power—but they are least effective in combating the weapons most often used by freedom's foes: subversion, infiltration and civil disorder."

A host of new weapons has been developed and used to equip the "special forces" in cases of "civil disorder." Among these are special armored amphibious vehicles that can transport men across flooded rice fields in pursuit of peasant guerrillas, naval landing craft with flame-throwers used to set fire to forests along river banks to eliminate ambush sites, helicopters equipped with machine-guns and rockets for moving troops quickly in raiding operations, special cameras for aerial reconnaissance of guerrilla night movements, chemicals and larvae sprayed from aircraft to destroy crops and trees in guerrilla-liberated zones. South Vietnam has been a vast laboratory for the testing of these and of other weapons and theories of counter-guerrilla warfare.

The late President Kennedy was reported as having "something approaching an obsession about guerrilla warfare." Under his administration, in addition to the above-mentioned departments in the Defense and State branches,

a Special Committee of top officials in Washington drew up and supervised "counter-insurgency efforts." By June 1963, according to a speech by Attorney-General Robert Kennedy, 57,000 government officials were being put through counter-insurgency courses. This is apart from the training given in the U.S. Army.

That this has become a built-in feature of American military and foreign policy programs is indicated by the fact that Kennedy's successor, President Lyndon Johnson, has not only continued the emphasis on "special forces" but has given them new twists and new applications. Johnson has retained in his administration the more rabid advocates of this type of "operation," such as Walter Rostow, Jr., and McGeorge Bundy. In Vietnam, new plans were announced in January 1964 for U.S.-trained "guerrillas" to be sent into North Vietnam to conduct terror raids and sabotage while the "counter-insurgency" program is stepped up in South Vietnam. A tougher policy for Latin America was announced, with right-wing military coups to be backed. Placed in charge of the Latin American intervention program was Thomas Mann, who had been a chief organizer of the military intervention in Guatemala, at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, and in San Salvador.

The main Special Warfare Center is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; it is here that

the U.S. "special forces" are trained. The declared objective of the Fort Bragg training program is to prepare these forces for "those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes or behavior necessary for the accomplishment of current U.S. policies and objectives." Large numbers of graduates from the Fort Bragg Center have been put into the field in South Vietnam to accomplish these objectives.

In an article on the Fort Bragg establishment in the London *Times* in July 1963, this program was described as "a distillation of the inflexible ideological approach to the problems of international power—referred to officially as 'motivation'—that lies beneath the training and behavior of officers and men throughout the armed forces . . . in the armed forces 'motivation' is as essential to a successful career as any of the more traditional military virtues." The motivation is "fierce dedication to the defeat of communism."

In September 1962 the U.S. Army began the recruitment of special *Spanish-speaking* units to undergo this training. In March 1963 an anti-guerrilla exercise held in Georgia by the Special Warfare Center included attached units from 17 countries.

These activities have been duplicated in

the areas where U.S. imperialism has built a military network against revolutionary change. The U.S.-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) maintains an anti-guerrilla training school in Thailand and has conducted anti-guerrilla war games in both the Philippines and in Thailand. In the Philippines, a member of SEATO, the Armed Forces General Military Council, at the behest of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in that country, announced in July 1962 the wholesale shift to anti-guerrilla training for Philippine combat troops. Other centers of "special warfare" training in Asia exist in Okinawa and South Vietnam.

For Latin American countries, the United States Caribbean Command Headquarters in the Panama Canal Zone maintains five schools for Latin American trainees in "techniques of dealing with clandestine movements, guerrilla fighting, and anti-constitutional attacks." This is in addition to an Inter-American Defense College established in the spring of 1962, for Latin American army officers. A joint hemisphere intelligence bureau is designed to watch "communist activities" and to "coordinate police and repressive action," while a special security committee set up at Punta del Este in January 1962, for the entire continent, puts Latin American police forces effectually under the CIA.

Military aid to Latin American countries has also been shaped to the new policy. The *New York Times* reported shortly after the Playa Giron invasion attempt in Cuba in April 1961, that one-third of all such aid is for "mobile striking forces that could deal with subversive outbreaks in cities and isolated mountain areas . . . helicopters, communications equipment, jeeps, small craft for intercepting shipments of smuggled foreign weapons along the coastline, small arms, supplies for paratroopers, and tear gas bombs."

This planning on a large scale for suppression and counter-revolution to cover whole areas of the globe is an indication of the extent and the depth of the crisis that faces imperialism (especially the United States). It is a measure, as well, of the noticeable revolutionary temper of the peoples in these broad areas.

The theories behind these world-wide police actions have evolved in the past ten years into a separate branch of military science. American practitioners of the arts of suppression, while having their own "rich traditions" to draw upon, have profited much from three main sources of inspiration for perfecting their techniques in the application of this science.

The first of these sources has been the French militarists.

The French Theory of Suppression

A large sector of the French officer corps came out of the experience of defeat by the revolutionary tide of the Vietnamese people with a sense of bitter frustration. Plunged almost at once into another struggle that gave equal damage to the French colonial and military prestige—the Algerian War of national liberation—their theoreticians evolved the doctrine of *la guerre révolutionnaire* and how to deal with it. In 1957 a number of treatises on “the revolutionary war” began appearing in French military journals.

Like all counter-revolutionary theories, this one of the French failed to go to the heart of the matter, to expose the true reasons for a revolt, or the true character of the colonialism responsible for it. At most, it touched only the periphery, in such conclusions as, “In appearance, all guerrilla activity is based more or less on a principle of justice” (Colonel Nemo); or, “The superiority of revolutionary war resides in two levers of extraordinary power: the conquest of the population, and ideological conviction” (Ximenes).

In general, the French approach was to view people in revolution as actually a minority (of “propagandists, agitators, ideologists, and politicians”) which had to be isolated. Thus, “revolutionary war” became “any armed com-

bat undertaken by a minority which progressively controls the population and which supplies it with motives to act against established authority or an authority which it refuses to recognize" (Ximenes).

To the French imperialists, therefore, their task was one of suppressing a minority and, although they devised a system for controlling whole populations that embraced political, economic, social and psychological factors, the objective was conceived of as the isolation of a minority from the whole people. Therefore, the remedying of the grievances of the whole people was considered not only unnecessary but likely to strengthen the revolutionary elements who would call upon the whole people not to accept a small concession but to seize all power.

In any case, to the French theorists it was the army that played the main role in all phases of the struggle: it must control an area by saturating it with armed forces, it must "super-vise" and "guide" the population, it must spread among the people a dense intelligence network, it must "maintain constant touch" with them.

The defeated French officer corps that came back from Indochina was imbued with the idea that *la guerre revolutionnaire*, in which ideological conviction gave people in revolt their superiority, must be fought against by an army in which dedication and indoctrination were

also predominant. This obsession produced the fascist sector of the French army that degenerated into the barbarous fanaticism of the O.A.S. In the last ditch stand it made against the final victory of the Algerian people, the O.A.S. sought to implement its theory of "a minority which progressively controls the population." The result was savage and senseless butchery. No better example exists of the futility of counter-revolutionaries seeking to use guerrilla tactics to stem the tide of a people in revolution than that of the O.A.S. The logical end of the French theory of *la guerre revolutionnaire* was in the debacle of the O.A.S.

The same dangerous and fanatical course has been pursued in the U.S. Army in recent years with a stepped-up indoctrination of troops in "anti-Communism," an ideology of hate that has no equal in American history. A core of fascist-minded professional army officers has been nurtured that is well on the way to becoming an American O.A.S. (O.A.S. leaders claimed to have had links with American military elements). It has already produced the fascist-racist Major General Edwin A. Walker, who led the rebellious assault on U.S. marshals enforcing racial integration at the University of Mississippi in 1962. It has spread the poison of fascism throughout the military establishment and into the political life of the nation. The persistent suspicions that the counter-revolutionary CIA in league with the

most reactionary forces in the United States played a part in the assassination of President Kennedy is in character with the reputation and activities of the "special forces" of United States military and political affairs.

The Nazi Theory

A second major source of inspiration for the U.S. Army field manuals used for "special forces" has been the Hitler Nazi army's *Manual for Warfare Against Bands*.

This manual, issued in May 1944, was the culmination of a series of directives and memoranda put out by the Nazi high command in the effort to cope with the massive Soviet guerrilla war carried on in the German-occupied areas of the Soviet Union during World War II. It was the most thorough body of instructions on anti-guerrilla tactics that had ever been produced up to the time. It favored in particular the tactics of encirclement and of annihilation through the use of extremely heavy fire power superior to that of the guerrilla force. Among its recommendations was the first advocacy of the use of helicopters as an anti-guerrilla weapon.

In the Nazi army the unit that acquired the most fame (or notoriety) in the implementation of these instructions was the Dirlewanger Brigade, led by SS Leader Dirlewanger. Dur-

ing the postwar War Crimes Trials, the German Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units, von dem Bach-Zelewski, admitted that "this 'Dirlewanger Brigade' consisted for the most part of previously convicted criminals; officially it consisted of so-called poachers, but it did include real criminals convicted of burglary, murder, etc."

The *Manual For Warfare Against Bands* was reputedly the distillation of wisdom in suppressing populations gained by the Nazis in three years of battling Soviet guerrillas and the guerrillas of all Europe. For all the terse, decisive ruthlessness that pervades this document, the best commentary upon it is the fact that the Nazi army never overcame any of the guerrilla forces that fought it, in the whole breadth of the European continent. Nevertheless, both American and British anti-guerrilla theoreticians have favored the adoption of the Nazi manual, contending that it came too late in the war to have had its effectiveness disproven. The counter-revolutionary seems to live on this form of desperate hope.

The British Experience

A third source that has contributed to the doctrine of the United States forces of suppression has been the experience of the British im-

perialists in their colonial wars in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya.

Two methods employed by the British—also used by the French but claimed to have been used more successfully by the British—have been introduced by American “special forces” in South Vietnam. They are the intensive use of helicopters, and the total evacuation of populations into “armed hamlets.” The British claim to have been successful in Cyprus with helicopters, and in Malaya with the “resettlement” of the mass supporters of the guerrillas.

The helicopter, of course, is not an absolute weapon against guerrillas. It is poor for reconnaissance because its noise telegraphs its approach. At best, in troop carrying, it is an extension of transportation and communication to areas not easily accessible, but it does not make the communication permanent. In combat operations it is a vulnerable target. Basically, however, no weapon is absolute. Guerrillas fight as they do in the first place because technologically they are weaker than their enemies at the outset. With resourcefulness, they have proven that the technological problem can be overcome.

As for the program of relocating populations, of removing them, supposedly, from contact with guerrillas, it is not new. It has been employed in every major anti-guerrilla effort in the modern era. The British did it in

the Boer War, in South Africa. The American army of occupation did it on a mass scale in the Philippines in 1899-1906, "reconcentrating" the population of whole provinces and ordering everyone found outside of the delimited area shot.

Mr. Roger Hilsman, Jr., the U.S. State Department anti-guerrilla expert before his removal for failure in February 1964, spoke of the concentration camps in South Vietnam as comparable to the stockades into which American settlers used to gather on western frontiers for protection against Indians. (It is interesting how the ruthless Indian war psychology keeps rising in the imperialist military mind.) Homer Bigart of the *New York Times* reported the nature of these "stockades" on June 23, 1962:

"Like villages of United States frontier days, the hamlets are sheltered behind rude defensive walls spiked with watch-towers and firing points. But the aim is not only to keep the enemy out but to control the population within, to isolate it from Communist guerrillas and make it obedient to the Government of President Ngo Dinh Diem."

The American frontiersman, however, would find nothing to recognize in this program that is ordered for the "hamlets":

". . . To carry out a thorough census of the people of each hamlet, to establish a background file and family list for each household,

to photograph the whole family without distinction of age or sex. . . . As for the suspected ones, be sure to arrest them and send them up to the provincial security service. . . . Most of the population is assigned to associations representing different age groups, and each association is to be divided into platoons, squads, cells . . . these organizations will select leaders through 'fully democratic elections' and . . . 'if civic action, youth and information cadres are a bit clever these democratic elections will not bring about any unexpected disastrous results; these people will elect whom we choose.' "

Within two years after the "strategic hamlet" program had been given emphasis in South Vietnam, the South Vietnam Liberation Front had succeeded in liberating them by the hundreds. This has been done in almost all cases through the combined and coordinated efforts of the guerrillas and of the confined people (who have decisively disproven the theory that a national liberation movement is a small minority that can be sealed away from the population as a whole). The "hamlets" have then been turned into "fighting villages" that armed themselves and fought against the imperialist-directed troops.

In Malaya, the British could claim success with "strategic hamlet" measures only because of special circumstances in that country: they had to relocate but a minority of the popula-

tion, usually the Chinese who lived along the edge of the forested regions and who to a greater degree than the Malays supported the Malayan Liberation Army. In South Vietnam, however, the U.S. "special forces" have had to deal with an entire united nation.

Armed with these theories and with ideological "motivation," the "special forces" of imperialism intend to treat all revolutionary situations as the work of a minority of agitators who are to be exterminated, while people and nations in revolt are to be held in armed camps until they have been pacified and made obedient.

Colonel C. M. Woodhouse, one of the British theoreticians of guerrilla (anti-guerrilla) warfare, has, however, this to say: "There has never been a successful guerrilla war conducted in an area where the populace is hostile to the guerrillas, and conversely it is impossible to stamp out a guerrilla war in an area where the populace continues to support the guerrillas."

Social Roots of People's Guerrilla Warfare

The relation of guerrillas to population is, of course, the key to an understanding of struggles for national liberation. Even among imperialist policy makers today it is generally acknowledged that such struggles are not isolated "patriotic uprisings" to be put down by a routine show of force, but are revolutions, of a mass character, that have developed out of long-standing conditions and that aim at a total change in a social order.

It is understood, too, that revolutions are not created by the reading of manifestos in a village street, but are produced by deep-seated, basic social conditions. To a great extent people under prolonged conditions of underdevelopment and exploitation are more prone to lethargy and to demoralization than to rebelliousness. However, when their conditions of life comparatively worsen, when they have a clear aim and when they are organized into a force, they become revolutionized and are ready for struggle.

That condition was reached in the period

following World War I and again in the period following World War II; in both periods upsurges of armed struggle occurred in colonial areas. The conditions were produced by *intensified* exploitation of colonial and semi-colonial countries by imperialist investors and market-seekers, who sought to realize a higher rate of profit on their war-expanded capital holdings. In the period after 1945 this intensification of imperialist operations was accompanied by moves to *reverse* the liberation efforts and hopes set in motion by the war against fascism, so that both economically and politically the effect was a worsening of conditions for the peoples in colonial areas. This has been the foundation of every major national liberation struggle in the past two decades.

Those who take up arms or who become organizers in the initial stages of popular guerrilla struggles are not, therefore, a minority of "agitators." They are actually the more advanced, more militant and more decisive elements of a revolutionized people. The fact that they are not "separate" from the people as a whole is best shown by the persistence and sacrifice with which the people as a whole support them, over periods of many years, during which they endure every form of suppression and torture designed to break that support.

Liberation Program in South Vietnam

A mere glance at the program of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, as an example, will show the truly national character of its struggle and why it has gained full popular support:

"The South Vietnam National Front For Liberation calls on the entire people to unite and heroically rise up to struggle in accordance with the program of action summarized as follows:

"1. To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem* lackey administration of the U.S., and to form a national democratic coalition administration.

"2. To bring into being a broad and progressive democracy, promulgate freedom of expression, of the press, of belief, of assembly, of association, of movement, and other democratic freedoms. To grant general amnesty to all political detainees, dissolve all concentra-

* The ouster and murder of Ngo Dinh Diem in a coup carried out by right-wing Vietnamese army officers closely linked to the U.S. military command in South Vietnam, on November 8, 1963, did not alter the situation. It merely revealed the callous manner in which imperialism discards a "lackey" who has become exposed. In the two shaky regimes that succeeded that of Diem, the disguise was frankly dropped and the American hand shown more openly.

tion camps dubbed 'prosperity zones' and all 'resettlement centers,' abolish the fascist laws and other anti-democratic laws.

"3. To abolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen, protect home-made products, encourage home industry and trade, expand agriculture and build an independent and sovereign economy. To provide jobs for unemployed people, increase wages for workers, army men and office employees. To abolish arbitrary fines and apply an equitable and rational tax system. To help displaced persons return to their native places if they so desire.

"4. To carry out land rent reduction, guarantee the peasants' right to till their present plots of land, redistribute communal land and advance toward land reform.

"5. To eliminate the enslaving and depraved U.S. style of culture, build a national and progressive culture and education. To eliminate illiteracy, open more schools, carry out reform in the educational and examination system.

"6. To abolish the system of American military advisers, eliminate foreign military bases in Vietnam and build a national army defending the Fatherland and the people.

"7. To guarantee the right of equality between men and women and among different nationalities and the right to autonomy of the national minorities.

"8. To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, to establish diplomatic relations with all countries which respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam.

"9. To re-establish normal relations between the two zones. To advance toward peaceful reunification of the Fatherland.

"10. To oppose aggressive war. To actively defend world peace."

"Politico-Military Strategy"

The causes of armed revolutionary struggle are well enough understood by the imperialist policy makers of police actions. As one American anti-guerrilla theoretician put it: "To win a revolutionary war, it is necessary to carry on a prolonged campaign for the support of a crucial social group. . . . Thus, the immediate problem of the United States is to develop a doctrine of counter-guerrilla warfare as one element of a broader politico-military strategy of counter-revolutionary war." (S. P. Huntington, in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, F. M. Osanka, Ed., Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, p. xxi.)

The "broad politico-military strategy," however, is only so broad as to include a "socio-economic phase" as a part of military operations. The army, in fact, is to carry out the

"socio-economic phase." The "breadth" of this phase is explained in a *New York Times* dispatch by Paul P. Kennedy on September 24, 1962:

"Another phase of the program is in the social and economic area. This is in the hope that military elements can gain civilian co-operation and respect through actively participating in public works construction. Such projects include construction of feeder roads, potable water supply systems, irrigation systems, sanitation works, and erection of local schools."

None of these measures goes beyond superficial palliatives that include none of the main demands of a revolutionary program: land reform, industrialization, and genuine independence. The reason for including only minor gestures of reform in a "socio-economic" program is succinctly stated by Roger Hilsman, Jr., the one-time U.S. State Department authority on anti-guerrilla operations:

"As for modernization . . . it cannot help much in a counter-guerrilla program. Modernization inevitably uproots established social systems, produces political and economic dislocation and tensions. . . . To summarize my feelings on popularity [of governments], reform and modernization: (1) they are important ingredients but are not the determinants of events and (2) their role must be measured

more in terms of their contributions to physical security." (*Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, pp. 459-461.)

In other words, feudal landlords, compradores tied to imperialist trade patterns, and corrupt politicians must remain in power, backed up by American "special forces" and military aid programs, to prevent "dislocation" and "tensions." This is the substance of the "unconventional war" doctrines of every imperialist power. The revolutionary demands of populations are met with counter-revolutionary war.

American policy makers who draw hope from the recollections of success in such a war against Filipinos fighting for independence in the early years of this century—as Hilsman has done—fail to take into account the difference in the historical periods then and now. The guerrilla war of Filipinos, who fought without allies from 1899-1906, was defeated then because it was an isolated phenomenon in an era of ascendent imperialism.

Today, however, imperialism is in an advanced state of decline, while every oppressed people that rises in arms has automatically a host of allies, in the socialist third of the world and in that other third of the world that has liberated itself but recently in one way or another from the imperialist hold. The popular guerrilla struggles of today do not occur in an

atmosphere of hopelessness, nor are they fought in sheer desperation. They ride upon a tide of history, looking with emulation at the great successful guerrilla struggles of the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Cuban, and the Algerian peoples, and with confidence that their own wars are just and that imperialist armies are no longer invincible.

No program that imperialism can put forth, military or "socio-economic," can stem the rising tide. In areas where suppression may be temporarily achieved, as in Cyprus or Kenya, stability is never regained. The armed struggle may subside, but the demands of the people remain, and soon the struggle is resumed. It will take a peaceful form wherever it can, but wherever imperialism is acute and ruthless, popular guerrilla warfare rises as the alternative.

The Philippine "Model"

One of the prime exhibits in U.S. policy for the suppressing of national liberation movements is the professed crushing of the Huk movement in the Philippines in the 1950's. In the lexicon of anti-guerrilla theory this is alleged to be a classic example of how to quell an armed revolutionary uprising, and it is used as a model for counter-revolutionary training wherever U.S. military programs are at work.

While it is true that the Huk movement was defeated militarily, the nature of the struggle and its proportions have either been ignored or have been exaggerated for the enhancement of American and Philippine militarist policies. It is useful to study this episode, for the real causes that gave rise to it, for the real causes of its outcome, and for the real situation that has resulted.

Situation After World War II

To begin with, there was at the outset no organized insurrectionary effort with clear-cut strategic and tactical aims in the Philippines,

as did occur in Indochina, in Malaya, in Algeria, or in Cuba. The wartime Hukbalahap (*Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon*—National Anti-Japanese Army) that had fought a guerrilla war against Japanese occupation, was disbanded after World War II and its cadres and mass members had shifted to legal forms of parliamentary and economic struggle. The Huk movement had been built originally on the pre-war peasant organizations, and, after the war, it comprised the mass base for the PKM (National Confederation of Peasants), the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations), and the Democratic Alliance, a new nationalist-oriented political party that entered into coalition with the mildly nationalist Nacionalista Party in the April 1946 elections.

These tactics of the popular nationalist movement in the Philippines differed from those of other national liberation forces in Asia that had gained arms in the struggle against Japan, such as the Viet Minh in Indochina which proclaimed independence and set up the Republic of Vietnam, or the Indonesians who confronted the returning Dutch colonialists with an assertion of independence.

The Huk movement had to take into account the fact that its organization was limited to half a dozen provinces on the island of Luzon while American-influenced guerrilla forces existed elsewhere. Furthermore there had been a legislated promise of independence by the

United States to occur in 1946, and a strong puppet political organization was ready to re-assume control in the country backed up by U.S. troops and by American-controlled Filipino armed forces.

In addition, the nature of the anti-fascist alliance in the country created a tendency of illusion even among the Huk masses in regarding the American army as an ally, and left the movement insufficiently prepared to deal with a returning colonial force. Although many Huk soldiers retained their arms when the war ended, in the interest of self-defense, the movement turned to constitutional, parliamentary struggles as the means of bringing a militantly nationalist program to the rest of the Filipino people.

In the elections of 1946, six Democratic Alliance congressmen were elected with overwhelming margins from the Central Luzon provinces. It was a minority party group, but it held the balance of power in the congress of a pro-American administration, and was therefore in a position to block the approval of legislation that would restore colonial relations in a nominally independent Philippines. At the same time, the PKM had forced the passage of a new crop-sharing tenancy act opposed by the landlords, and the CLO was organizing militant unions in American-owned industries.

Acting at imperialist instigation (Filipino military forces were still under the com-

mand of American officers), the government launched a suppression policy against these legal forms of expression for the Filipino masses. It ousted the Democratic Alliance congressmen from office arbitrarily and without cause, rammed through colonialist legislation that tied the Philippines to the pre-independence market relations with the United States, and brutally terrorized and finally outlawed the PKM and the CLO.

The terror fell with particular savagery upon Central Luzon where, in the attempt to break the strong mass movement, indiscriminate killings, murder, torture, mass arrests, and the wholesale razing of villages were employed. It was here that the armed struggle began, as a defensive measure during attacks upon villages by government troops and by private landlord-hired fascist units.

In the face of these mailed-fist blows, the Huk armed forces regrouped and fought, spontaneously and virtually without central guidance. The Communist Party, which had provided much of the leadership for the movement during the Japanese occupation, was at this time disorganized, without unity on strategy and tactics, and with no clear perspective for the period ahead. At best, provincial organizations of the Communist Party, of the Democratic Alliance, of the PKM and of the CLO, largely on their own, were giving direction to

peasants arming themselves and fighting back against suppression.

This condition, in fact, prevailed from mid-1946 until mid-1948, a period of constant and spreading fighting, during which time the leaders of the movement called merely for a democratic peace and the restoration of the former state of democratic rights, such as they were. Only the heroism and the fighting capacity of the people, with leaders who fought largely on their own initiative, frustrated and turned this phase of the imperialist-ordered suppression into a failure.

Stages of the Huk Struggle

It was not until May 1948 that a more clearly-oriented leadership was chosen and that a program of struggle with definite liberation aims was adopted. It was only then that the outworn makeshift Hukbalahap organization was replaced by a new organizational policy built around a reshaped HMB (*Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan*—National Army of Liberation). An expansion drive was projected beyond the Central Luzon provinces, with political organizers accompanied by armed units starting to build a nation-wide underground mass liberation movement.

Even at this point, however, there was no insurrectionary plan, and the effort was made

to employ the expanding strength of the Huks as a lever to attain a democratic peace, for the resumption of parliamentary struggle. The slogan adopted in 1948 was: "Legal, parliamentary means alone cannot obtain a democratic peace."

Peace conditions of the movement were centered on the insistence that the government adopt a pro-nationalist, anti-imperialist line. At any time up to this point the American imperialists and their landlord-comprador allies in the Philippines could have attained peace without a radical change in the social system and without a tremendous waste of more lives and resources, merely by lifting the policies of suppression.

In mid-1948, after the death of Manuel Roxas, the president who initiated the mailed-fist policy, the Huk movement maneuvered for and accepted an amnesty from the new president, Elpidio Quirino. The only conditions were a restoration of a semblance of democratic rights and the adoption of nationalist policies of independence from imperialist control by the Quirino administration in exchange for a surrender of arms. The amnesty, however, broke down when the government, prodded by American advisers who insisted on smashing all popular movements by military force, exhibited bad faith, murdering or arresting the first Huks who presented themselves.

Although an armed struggle and an expansion policy were pursued by the Huk leadership throughout 1948 and 1949, it still did not give up the possibility of a democratic settlement. It vigorously endorsed and supported the opposition Nacionalista Party and its candidate, Jose P. Laurel, in the 1949 national elections, in hope of a peaceful nationalist-oriented agreement if the Nacionalista Party won. Laurel, however, was defeated by wholesale fraud and terror that provoked a revolutionary temper throughout the country. (In the province of Batangas an independent revolt broke out at this time led by aroused Nacionalista elements.)

In January 1950, after three and a half years of suppression and resistance, the Huk movement, declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation, finally called for the overthrow of the imperialist-puppet regime that had exterminated democratic rights and urged the people generally to take up arms to achieve liberation. It was only at this point that the Huk movement passed over from defensive tactics and the tactics of reconciliation to tactics of the offensive.

Imperialist spokesmen have since declared and claimed that the Huk armed struggle was defeated by a mixture of force and attraction, by a combination of measures of military suppression and of political and economic re-

form. The assumption is that the same type of measure can suppress national liberation movements elsewhere.

The assumption is false even if based upon the Philippine experience itself. While steps were taken to minimize fraud and terrorism in elections, beginning in 1951, reforms were superficial, were almost wholly of a propaganda nature, and had little if any effect on the lives of the peasantry and the workers. So-called agrarian reform laws that were passed during the presidency of Ramon Magsaysay (an absolute puppet of the American military advisory group) who came into office in 1953, caused no changes whatsoever in the conditions of the peasantry, who actually suffered a worsening of their circumstances after they were adopted. The principal factor in the setback to the Huk movement was ruthless military suppression, carried out with vast quantities of U.S. military aid, by an army equipped, trained and supervised by an American military advisory group. Even this, however, would have been ineffective but for deficiencies within the Huk movement itself.

Causes for Defeat of Huks

That the Huk movement in the Philippines failed to achieve the successes of its brother liberation movements in other areas was due in

large part to serious tactical errors and errors of estimate by the Huk leadership at the beginning of 1950. That the situation made unavoidable an armed struggle of an insurrectionary nature at that point seems clear enough. However, the fundamental principle that was suited to a struggle of this kind—that of a protracted war with the elements of attrition involved—was neglected in favor of a relatively rapid progression toward seizure of power, with the illusion of achieving a relatively quick victory. Phases of legal struggle that were still possible and the creation of a broad united front of a nationalist character were neglected in favor of a rapid build-up of Huk armed forces. The prospect of a long and difficult struggle was not posed before the movement and its masses, who were left unprepared for the demands of endurance later placed upon them.

To a great extent this error can be traced to the comparative isolation of the Philippine national liberation movement. Only one or two of its leaders had ever been outside of the Philippines; none had ever been in a position to share the experiences and lessons of other struggles in other countries. Not a single theoretical work by any Marxist or non-Marxist authority on guerrilla struggle or armed revolutionary struggle was in the possession of the Huk movement. The victory of the Chinese revolution, which had been completed by the end of 1949,

was a major factor in the Huk decision to take the offensive in 1950 and the successes of the Chinese Red Army were looked upon as a model to follow, but the theories of Mao Tse-Tung on the protracted war and its elements were scarcely heard of and played no part in Huk deliberations on strategy and tactics.

In October 1950 the Huk movement suffered its most serious blow with the arrest of its entire top leading committee, in the city of Manila, and, with it, the seizure of the movement's files that exposed to suppressive agencies the Huk tactical plans, estimates, disposition of forces, cadre lists and their assignments, sources of supply, contacts, and other relevant information. The effect of this was the loss of initiative by the Huks at a time of developing an offensive, and the proving of Marx's dictum that "the defensive is the death of every armed rising."

This setback was not due to the skill or strength of imperialist forces, but to the overconfidence, carelessness and faulty security measures of the national liberation movement, that attempted to maintain its leading committee in a location where it was least able to protect it. The arrest, even then, was due only to the opportunist surrender of the head of a Huk armed unit in Manila (a new recruit, untested and mistakenly promoted to responsibility) who informed on his comrades for money, and

not to the ingenuity of military intelligence. While losses of this type are a feature of most liberation struggles (the capture of Ben Bella and his fellow leaders during the Algerian War and the near-fatal losses to the Castro party on its return to Cuba in 1956 are other examples), in no case could it have been so easily avoided or did it have such disastrous effects as in the Philippines.

Together with these theoretical and organizational defects, in neither the military forces of the Huk nor in the Philippine Communist Party did there exist even one leader with anything approaching a grasp of over-all military theory or of the elements of its strategy and tactics affecting the Philippine situation. The lack of military leadership was equalled by the quality of arms in the hands of the Huks and of the guerrilla technology known to them. Except for a handful of machine guns seldom used, the heaviest-calibered weapon was the Browning automatic rifle; the mortar, the grenade or any type of explosive and its use were absent from the Huk equipment and knowledge.

The Huks possessed no radio system, no communications equipment of any kind, no means of transportation. No technician of skill was in the ranks of the movement. Its peasant and worker members were armed chiefly with courage. No aid of any kind, whether in the

form of arms, funds or training facilities, was available from outside the Philippines, where the struggle was conducted in isolation from allies or sympathizers from abroad. No groups or committees, to inform the world of what was happening or to rally international support, existed anywhere, unlike the circumstances of other liberation struggles.

Despite these circumstances, an army of 54,000 men (including an air force and a navy), plus an equal number of "civilian guards" and other auxiliaries, were kept in the field against the Huks for a decade or more, during which an estimated one billion dollars were expended for military suppression by the American and Philippine governments.

This is the "model" for suppression that American anti-guerrilla theorists utilize in training counter-revolutionary "special forces" in the U.S. Army and in its adjuncts in Latin America and in Asia.* It is a grave error, however, to consider that what happened in the Philippines can be duplicated in any other situation *where every shortcoming of the Huk struggle has been foreseen, avoided or overcome*. The Huk movement suffered its set-

* A chief instructor of the CIA's invasion force that made the fiasco on the Cuban beaches at Playa Giron in April 1961 was a Filipino colonel who headed the most notorious of the anti-Huk units in the Philippine Army, "The Skull Unit."

backs, in the main, because of its own tactical faults; it was due less to the strength and policies of the forces of suppression. *Wherever a national liberation movement has adopted the correct tactics and made use correctly of the forces at its disposal, it has triumphed and won freedom and independence for its people.*

In the Philippines itself, in spite of the claims of the Philippine Army and of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) which trained, equipped and directed that army, the Huk movement was never actually destroyed. The subsiding of the armed struggle after 1955 was due in part to a shift of tactics by the movement that finally recognized the necessity for a protracted struggle and for a combination of armed struggle and legal struggle tactics.

During 1962, sixteen years after the beginning of the anti-Huk campaigns in the Philippines, military authorities estimated that 300 Huks were still actually in arms and that the movement was in a state of resurgence. In the province of Pampanga alone, seventeen commanders were reported leading guerrilla units, and provincial authorities claimed that virtually every village in the province supported and aided the Huks. In March 1964 large-scale division-sized operations by the Philippine Army (still advised by the JUSMAG) were reported in progress in Pampanga and in other Central Luzon provinces, against "the suc-

cessful reorganization of the Huk top hierarchy and the recruitment of cadres."

The long Huk struggle, furthermore, has nourished a broad rebirth of nationalism among Filipinos, has contributed to the breakdown of old patterns of colonial political control, and has augmented a condition of imperialist instability in the Philippines.

There is every reason to believe that the Philippine national liberation movement has learned valuable lessons from its experiences, can overcome its setbacks, and will move into the next phases of its struggle prepared for every demand that necessity makes upon it.

Democracy, Peace and Colonial Wars

As in the case of all imperialist policies, the armed suppression of colonial struggles for freedom has its grave impact upon the imperialist country itself. Since one of the principal aims of guerrilla warfare is attrition, the prolongation of this type of struggle tends to sap the wealth and means of the suppressor, while the brutal methods employed erode as well the country's moral fiber.

No better example of this process can be seen than in the case of France, which experienced two major crises in the recent period due to attempts at colonial suppression, first in what is now Vietnam and afterward in Algeria. France was brought to the brink of bankruptcy and passed through turbulent political crises typified by a rapid succession of governments, while its democratic features were threatened with destruction by the fascist forces generated by suppressive policies. These policies, in addition, brought on a sense of national guilt and a moral crisis as the facts of torture and murder employed against the Vietnamese and the Algerian people became increasingly known.

Although imperialism makes use of all the propaganda means at its command to conceal the aims and the nature of the suppression that it carries on and to distort the aims and the nature of guerrilla struggle, a deception that is facilitated by the remoteness of the area in which it usually takes place, it is a facade that cannot be sustained. The drawn-out and indecisive warfare and the gradual realization of its true nature lead inevitably to protests at home and to demands for an end to the intervention.

In varying degrees, almost all wars of suppression have resulted in popular protests and in opposition from the people of the imperialist countries themselves, many of whom understand and admire a guerrilla struggle for freedom. For workers in particular, an identity with the peasants and workers in the colonial countries who are resisting the suppressing of their unions and their political organizations is a natural one. In the modern world, too, guerrilla movements have become synonymous with resistance to oppression and to foreign invasion. The long and heroic struggle of the Chinese people against Japanese invasion and against a corrupt and oppressive foreign-backed Kuomintang regime awoke world-wide admiration, while the many guerrilla movements that fought German and Japanese fascism during World War II identified this form of

struggle definitely as having a popular mass base with democratic aims.

The Anti-Imperialist League

One of the most outspoken and most effective of all protests against a suppressive war in a colonial area occurred in the United States during the conquest of the Philippines by the American army. The Anti-Imperialist League, organized formally on November 18, 1898, won the support of some of the foremost Americans of the time and conducted a vigorous and impressive campaign against both the acquisition of the Philippines as a colony and the type of war waged on the Filipino people.

The following resolution, adopted at a national convention of the Anti-Imperialist League in Chicago on April 30, 1899, was typical of its stand:

"We earnestly condemn the policy of the present administration in the Philippines. It is the spirit of '76 that our government is striving to extinguish in those islands: we denounce the attempt and demand its abandonment. We deplore and resent the slaughter of the Filipinos as a needless horror, a deep dishonor to our nation."

Among those who joined or lent their names to the Anti-Imperialist League were Mark

Twain, Jane Addams, Senator John Sherman, Grover Cleveland, Carl Schurz, Samuel Gompers, Moorfield Storey, David Starr Jordan, Andrew Carnegie, Edward Atkinson, Bishop Henry Potter, Gamaliel Bradford. Some of the major literary figures of the time—Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, Hamlin Garland, William Vaughn Moody, William Graham Sumner—wrote poetry and essays condemning the brutal military measures used against the Filipino freedom struggle.

"G is for guns that McKinley has sent/To teach Filipinos what Jesus Christ meant," wrote Henry Blake Fuller, in a satirical contribution to *Liberty Poems*, an anthology of anti-imperialist verse published in Boston in 1900.

Millions of pieces of literature were distributed by the League during the years from 1898–1904, and countless meetings brought its campaign to Americans throughout the United States. The AIL was an important influence on the presidential election of 1900, and it succeeded in having an anti-imperialist plank written into the Democratic Party platform of that year which condemned "the war of criminal aggression against the Filipinos."

The unrelenting exposures by the League of atrocities committed by American troops during counter-insurgency operations against Filipino guerrillas and against the civilian population (the shooting of prisoners, the "water-

cure" and other tortures, the ruthless herding of the populace into concentration camps) were widely publicized in the press and put the administration of both William McKinley and of his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, on the defensive. Demands for a formal investigation, stimulated by the League, finally had to be answered by the government. Senatorial hearings, held from January to May 1902, put the evidence of atrocities on the record. They led to the ending of military rule and the instituting of civil government in the Philippines.

The Anti-Imperialist League continued its activities long after the final crushing of the Filipino armed resistance, and Filipino independence leaders who later worked closely with its members gave it credit for helping to secure legislation in the American congress that put the Philippines on the road to self-rule.

Although the AIL played an important part in exposing and in forcing a modification of the harsher and more brutal aspects of a developing American imperialism, it was concerned more with the *methods* than with the *system* of imperialist control. The struggle at the time was between the proponents of an outright colonial empire (centered in the Republican Party) and those who favored indirect control (who were allied with the Democratic Party). As soon as the shift toward indirect control was made, the AIL began to die away,

with only a handful of its members adhering to a basic anti-imperialist position. Significant as its earlier work was, the AIL's acceptance of the neo-colonialism that was to become the hallmark of American imperialism on a world scale sets it apart from the revolutionary anti-imperialist movements of today.

Other Protest Movements

Americans who expressed this strong protest against "counter-guerrilla operations" of their government at the turn of the century were equally concerned with similar military measures undertaken in other colonial areas by imperialist powers. Committees and mass meetings were organized in American cities to protest the treatment of the Boers in their guerrilla war against British domination in South Africa, where the same ruthless measures were put into effect during the same period by Kitchener, Roberts and the other British commanders. Protests came also from the American people against the barbarous policies of the Belgian imperialists under King Leopold in the Congo.

In the 1920's American sympathy was stirred by the Nicaraguan nationalist, Sandino, who conducted guerrilla action against the U.S. Marines sent into his country to stamp out

opposition to imperialist mining interests and to the dominant United Fruit Company. Demands to "pull the Marines out of Nicaragua" followed reports of abuses by American troops in carrying out their suppressive assignment.

During the dramatic guerrilla struggle by Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement against the terroristic regime of Batista in Cuba, the American people, impressed by its human appeal and by the obvious justice of its cause, were overwhelmingly sympathetic to it. It was not until the press and government agencies in the United States, at the bidding of American corporations which found that they could not dictate to the new popular government in Cuba, set out in full cry after Castro that this sympathy was disturbed. Despite the torrent of anti-Cuban propaganda, and the persecution of those who have opposed the imperialistic American policy toward that country, a large section of the American people have continued to support the right of the Cuban people to have their own form of government and have protested the counter-revolutionary raids and sabotage conducted against Cuba by the CIA and by the "special forces" of the U.S. Army.

The most significant feature of the operations of the U.S. Army's "special forces" is the secrecy in which they are conducted. Attacks on Cuba have been unpublicized and have

reached the attention of the American people as a rule only when the Cuban government has made them known in denouncing them.

American imperialist intervention in South Vietnam and the major combat role played there by American troops was concealed from the American people for years, and was only given partial publicity when mounting losses in combat against the guerrilla forces of the South Vietnam Liberation Front could no longer be hidden. Even then, references to and accounts of American leadership and participation in the war of suppression against the Vietnamese people have continued to be scanty, with reports of American army activities heavily censored. The actual number of American troops in that country and the operations in which they engage have still never been fully revealed.

Only one explanation can be given for this: fear of the reaction from the American people, fear of their protest, fear of demands for the ending of intervention. Suppression with all its brutalities is no secret to the Vietnamese people; they have lived with it daily, and publication of the facts will tell them nothing new. It is the American people who would learn, and who would protest. In the words of the Pentagon's own spokesmen, the war of suppression in South Vietnam is "a dirty war," "an unpopular war."

Another case in recent memory of an "unpopular war" was the Korean War, which also had all the elements of intervention, of suppression of guerrilla forces, and of the terrorization of the population in a semi-colonial country. When huge American losses piled up in that conflict that was obviously not in the interests of the American people, the stirring of protests and of mass discontent contributed to bringing it to an end. The election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 was due in part to his campaign promise to negotiate an end to the "dirty war" in Korea.

As the "counter-guerrilla operation" in South Vietnam has dragged on, its reactionary and its corroding effect has been felt among wide sections of the American people. A public letter of 65 leading American intellectuals condemned the war in April 1963. It was followed by the protests of over 5,000 American clergymen against the persecution of Buddhists that sprang from imperialist backing for the brutal Diem regime. Other protests have been made against the napalm bombing of villages by American airmen, and against the spraying of noxious chemicals from the air upon crops and orchards. Even the imperialists themselves have become appalled at the cost of the war of suppression, which has become a financial and political liability, and calls for the withdrawal

of American troops have come from leading American congressional circles.

Colonial War and World Peace

There is another aspect to the popular reaction in all the imperialist countries against suppressive "counter-insurgency" wars. The struggles for freedom in the colonial and semi-colonial areas coincide today with the great world-wide peace movement that has for its primary aim the prevention of a nuclear war of annihilation between the powers that represent the two main world social systems. This powerful opposition to preparations for war has arisen most strongly in the imperialist countries and has been directed against the big armaments programs and the plans for major wars of aggression that serve imperialist policies.

While the peace movement in general has concentrated its attention on ending the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, its more advanced sections have raised demands for the abolition of overseas military bases, for the withdrawal of armed forces stationed abroad, and for the ending of armed intervention in the affairs of other countries, recognizing the relation of colonial wars to the fight for peace and to the preservation of democracy at home.

This relationship has been most clearly seen in the consequences of American imperialist intervention in Cuba and in South Vietnam. These counter-revolutionary wars and "special operations" have been accompanied by a spread of fascist and other reactionary forces in the United States (such as the John Birch Society and the Goldwater phenomenon), which have been emboldened by official interventionist policies to shout for increased onslaughts on national liberation movements and on newly-independent countries, and for nuclear war on the socialist countries. President John F. Kennedy, who fostered the development of a "counter-insurgency" program, was himself under attack by these elements at the time of his assassination for not invading Cuba outright or not taking a tough enough line with the Soviet Union.

It is no accident that the program of the John Birchers and the Goldwater-ites runs the gamut from war and suppression abroad to segregation and denial of civil liberties at home. It is impossible to have policies of suppression and intervention abroad without encouraging all forms of suppression in the home country. Conversely, the struggle for peace, to have any real meaning or effect at all, cannot be dissociated from the fight for democracy, which is threatened by those who want to make war abroad.

The Negro people in the United States, most of all, have drawn the correct conclusions about the relation of their struggle for freedom with that of the Cubans, of the Vietnamese, and particularly that of the Africans. Colonial liberation has had a tremendous impact on American Negroes, and the demonstrations that followed the imperialist-instigated murder of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and the sympathy shown by Negroes in the United States for Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution are an indication that they are a great reservoir of support for the struggle against wars of intervention and suppression. Many Negroes, particularly those involved in the civil rights movement, have made it known that they would refuse to participate in any military intervention in Cuba.

Any program of opposition to the forces that make colonial wars, which are the same forces that prepare for nuclear war, is inadequate if it fails to include demands for civil rights, for the use of national resources for a "war on poverty" instead of wars on people, for the repeal of the anti-democratic McCarran Laws, and for the abolition of the witch-hunting bodies like the House Un-American Activities Committee.

A demand for the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam is as much a part of the campaign for peace and disarmament

as is a test ban treaty. As yet this phase of the peace movement has been overshadowed by the menace of nuclear warfare, but as the imperialists are forced more and more toward abandonment of preparations for a major war, the drive must inevitably be expanded toward putting an end to all unjust wars, including in particular wars of aggression against colonial peoples.

Communists and Guerrilla Warfare: Historical Background

It has been charged by the advocates of repressive "special forces" that guerrilla warfare has been "taken over" by the Communists "for their purposes," or, in other words, that Communists are putting an ancient form of warfare to reprehensible uses that would not otherwise have arisen. The imperialists seek to create two impressions with this charge: to link Communists with violence in the achievement of their ends, and to make it seem that all armed struggles for liberation are Communist "instigated."

It is true that the leadership in popular armed struggles of the present historical period is in many cases provided by Communists, while in some other cases these struggles have been influenced by an acceptance by their leaders of the Communist theories of guerrilla warfare. Other major armed struggles for liberation, however, have been conducted by non-Communist movements in the present period, such as Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement, the FLN of Algeria, and the independence war in Angola.

Two basic processes have contributed to these developments. One has been the creation, over the past half century or longer, of the objective conditions that have produced revolutionary situations in one country after another of the imperialist system. The other has been the evolvment, in the fire of struggle, of the strategy and tactics of the oppressed peoples to overcome the means of force at the disposal of their oppressors, and to gain power themselves. The leadership of these struggles has depended upon the existing relations of forces in each country, although even in those countries where the national bourgeoisie assumes that leadership (as in the case of Algeria), victory has been made possible by the prior triumphs of Communist strategic and tactical leadership of the Russian, the Chinese, the Vietnamese and other peoples.

Views of Marx and Engels

Marxist-Leninist theory has provided the most effective answers to the problems of revolutionary movements in the modern era, from the organization of study groups and trade unions to the conduct of armed struggles. From the days of the *Communist Manifesto*, the works of Marx and Engels were filled with the discussion of the tactics of gaining power for the proletariat and its allies.

Both were aware that there are many forms of revolutionary struggle, depending on the conditions of a given situation, and that guerrilla warfare is among them. Engels, in particular, devoted a great deal of attention to military studies, to the use of military tactics, and to the role of armed forces in the service of the state. Marx, as early as 1849, was making this observation:

"A nation, fighting for its liberty, ought not to adhere rigidly to the accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary methods, guerrilla bands everywhere; such are the only means by which a small nation can hope to maintain itself against an adversary superior in numbers and equipment. By their use a weaker force can overcome its stronger and better organized opponents."

Guerrilla warfare, however, although appreciated for its revolutionary role in wars of national independence, such as those in Spain (against Napoleonic occupation) or in Greece (against Turkish domination), or in cases of resistance to an invader (such as in the Franco-Prussian War), was looked upon by Marx and Engels as only one of a number of means of conducting the class struggle. It was seen as part of a larger political struggle in which armed combat occurred only under certain well-defined and unavoidable conditions. Also, it was seen as but one phase or possibility in the range of military struggle which could ex-

tend from full-scale war to a mere armed demonstration in the street.

One of the most important features of the development of Marxist theory has been the ideological struggle against the irresponsible use of violence. The terrorism of the nihilists and of the anarchists was rejected as senseless and unrelated to the main task of organizing the forces and understanding the conditions of a revolutionary period. The *coup d'etat* and adventurism each were condemned for violation of the same principle. Among the nineteenth century revolutionists whose ideas were repudiated by the Marxists was Louis Blanc, who advocated the seizure of power by small tightly-organized bodies of armed conspirators. Marxists favored the participation of the masses and their political education through every conceivable form of struggle.

Marx and Engels projected barricade tactics as a form of armed struggle in the revolutions of 1848-1850 in Europe, when the proletariat sought to advance the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of that time to a further stage. But they quickly recognized the inadequacy of meeting the military power of the modern capitalist state with paving stone and pistols. Barricade tactics came to be seen as only one form of broader struggles. At no time have Communists seized upon one form of struggle as applicable to all situations.

The setbacks given to mass insurrectionary

struggles in the middle period of the nineteenth century, when capitalism was consolidating itself, led to a major shift of tactics by the Second International to electoral struggles by working class parties. This was endorsed by Marx and Engels. In a stage of expansion enhanced by *laissez faire* policies, capitalism could permit a degree of working class political activity. When it moved into its monopolist stage, however, and into deeper crises, it sharply curtailed the liberties of the people. Imperialist wars of plunder, in addition, were accompanied by suppression of the working class at home.

The need then for militant revolutionary tactics brought about a very sharp ideological struggle within the Second International which came to a head during the first world war. The Third, or Communist, International, that eventually came into being as a result of this fight, recognized the need, at given, well-defined times, of both legal peaceful methods and of armed revolutionary struggle, the choice depending on the conditions and the methods of rule of the imperialist classes and on the readiness and organization of the people.

Marx, of course, was well aware of the folly of relying on rigid, prescribed methods of struggle. He made this plain over a century ago:

"A class in which the revolutionary interests of society are concentrated, so soon as it has

risen up, finds directly in its own situation the content and material of its revolutionary activity: foes to be laid low, measures, dictated by the needs of the struggle, to be taken; the consequences of its own deeds drive it on." (K. Marx, *The Class Struggles in France*, International Publishers, 1964, p. 42-43.)

When the Paris Commune came into its brief existence in 1871, Marx soon recognized the decisive and far-reaching needs of the civil war, The lesson of that historic episode, Marx held, was that the working class should not only take up arms in its defense and in the defense of its gains, but must not permit "conscientious scruples" to prevent it from using civil war once it has started to overthrow the old reactionary state and all its armed agencies of suppression.

The Views of Lenin

Lenin, in the era of imperialism, carried these lessons to their logical application under circumstances in which workers and peasants faced a reactionary state with armed agencies of suppression and intervention developed to their highest degree. In the Russian Revolution of 1905, that great revolutionary seed-bed of this century, all the modern forms of mass struggle came into bloom: the general strike,

barricades, mutiny in the army—and guerrilla warfare.

On January 25, 1905, as the revolution against Tsardom was growing, Lenin proclaimed: "The arming of the people is becoming an immediate task of the revolutionary movement. Only an armed people can be the real bulwark of popular liberty!" ("The Beginning of the Revolution in Russia," *Collected Works*, Volume VIII, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, p. 99.) Lenin saw armed struggle as a legitimate form of mass struggle, and held that the revolutionary forces must have a *revolutionary army* to pit against the repressive forces of the Tsarist state, starting with revolutionary detachments conducting partisan or guerrilla warfare against the initially stronger military power. In reply to those who deprecated such methods, he pointed out that "Partisan warfare should be ennobled by the enlightening and organizing influence of socialism." ("Guerrilla Warfare," *Ibid.*, Vol. XI, p. 222.)

In the Civil War of 1918–1921 that followed the Russian Socialist Revolution, the tactics of guerrilla warfare were applied on a vast scale by the Red Army, and were a major element in the defeat of the imperialist-backed counter-revolutionary armies. "He wins in war," said Lenin in the course of it, "who has the greater reserves, the greater source of

strength, the greater endurance in the mass of the people."

While modern weapons of war in the hands of the state substantially thwarted mass struggles in the nineteenth century, modern mass production of weapons was the very factor that made them available to the people, while the training of huge mass armies gave military experience to large sectors of the people, equipping them for the conduct of armed struggle in a revolutionary period. There was a direct link between the conscription of the enormous Tsarist armies in 1914 and the emergence of the regular and irregular units of the Red Army in 1918.

Lenin was aware that the imperialist world conflict of 1914–1918, and the socialist revolution to which it had given birth, were but the beginning of a long period of difficult struggles marking the decline and eventual collapse of capitalism. He knew that the capitalist-imperialist countries would use every form of violence to retain their colonies and their system, and he felt that the oppressed peoples of all countries should prepare themselves for struggles of a violent nature that would be forced upon them.

In 1918 he foresaw that "violence will cover a world historical period, a whole era of wars of the most various kinds—imperialist wars, civil wars within a country, the inter-

weaving of the former with the latter, national wars, the emancipation of the nationalities crushed by the imperialists and by various combinations of imperialist powers which will inevitably form various alliances with each other in the era of vast state-capitalist and military trusts and syndicates. This is an era of tremendous collapses, of wholesale military decisions of a violent nature, of crises. It has already begun, we see it clearly—it is only the beginning.” (From “Report On Revising The Programme And Name Of The Party,” delivered at the 7th Congress of the R.C.P. (B.), March 8, 1918. *Selected Works*, International Publishers, Vol. VIII, pp. 315–16.)

These remarks by Lenin have frequently been quoted out of context, in an attempt to prove Communist predilection for violence. The violence that he predicted, however, clearly has its source in the forces of imperialism and not in the forces of socialism. This is, actually, an assessment of an historical period during which a lone socialist country was surrounded by aggressive imperialist powers eager to destroy it, but torn themselves by uncontrollable rivalries. It was a period spanned by two world wars that arose out of those rivalries, a period featured by the brutal class violence of fascism, all of which underscored the correctness of Lenin's estimate.

This was, however, an estimate of an histori-

cal period that has now evolved into a new period, the major feature of which is the acceptance of the socialist system by many countries and its growth in conjunction with other powerful forces that tend to curtail and to restrain the recourse of capitalism to violence as a means of solving its problems. Lenin, whose constant emphasis was on "the concrete analysis of concrete conditions," would have been the first to have recognized a new situation.

In the period between World War I and World War II, the Communist International, founded in 1919, projected and participated in the great united front anti-war movements against fascism, endeavoring in every possible way to prevent aggressive fascist imperialism from unleashing war upon the peoples of the world. At the same time it supported armed struggles for liberation conducted by colonial peoples, who then received the first assaults by the military programs of fascism and by the aggressive sectors of imperialism.

The point where imperialist rivalry, aggrandizement and exploitation reached their peak in this period was in China, and it was in China, consequently, that popular revolutionary armed struggle was developed to its fullest degree under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

*Imperialist Violence and People's
Guerrilla Warfare*

The popular guerrilla warfare of the modern era is a direct result of the violence employed by monopoly capitalism against the working class and against the colonial peoples in efforts to prolong its existence.

The proliferation of popular guerrilla movements in the period since World War II has been a direct parallel to imperialist policies of force, to the militarization of their societies, to atomic diplomacy, to the enormous increase of military bases erected by imperialism in colonial and semi-colonial countries, to the tremendous military aid programs to bolster feudal puppet regimes, to the creation of military blocs astride the remaining areas of imperialist domination. In the face of these military measures that are backed up by aggressive military policies, with peaceful means of expression denied, liberation movements, struggling at every step for peaceful, legal existence, have been frequently driven into armed methods of defending themselves, of maintaining themselves, and of developing themselves, in a manner dictated by the necessity of coping with a ruthless opponent armed to the teeth.

Popular guerrilla warfare has offered one

means by which this can be done. However, neither Communist-led nor non-Communist-led liberation movements view it as anything but a stage in the tactics of contending with imperialist domination. As previously pointed out, political mass movements, utilizing peaceful or generally peaceful forms of struggle, together with the operation of world factors that often inhibit imperialism from resort to open intervention or aggression, have been instrumental in an equal number of cases in gaining independence for once-colonial areas. These, of course, have benefited favorably from the decisive military-political victories in other areas. It is impossible today to disassociate the events in one sector of the world from what occurs in any other sector.

Guerrilla warfare is a type of warfare demanding determined, disciplined and uncompromising leadership, withal in the context of popular democracy. The Communist Party has been the party that has best given this type of leadership and this kind of revolutionary content, in whatever struggle it has been committed. However, Communists have been among the first to acknowledge that independence and popular programs can be achieved by other means when the circumstances have made it possible, and they have always worked hard to employ those other means. In Korea, in Laos, and as proposed in Vietnam, they have readily

turned from armed struggle to armed truces and negotiations to realize popular and national objectives. In the recent Philippine armed struggle, from its beginning to its end, the Huk leaders made known their readiness to negotiate and to arrive at a democratic peace. Communists have never been wedded to armed means and, even when these means have been undertaken through no other alternative, have been ready to terminate them whenever the possibility has arisen of gaining ends by avoiding unnecessary losses.

When Hitler Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, another aspect of this form of struggle in the modern period revealed itself: in the total resistance against conquest by a people who have experienced liberation and socialism. The mass guerrilla warfare employed against the Nazi armies (which was paralleled in the postwar years in Indochina and in Indonesia when French and Dutch imperialists sought to reinvade those countries) was but a forecast of the type of warfare that imperialist armies could expect in any aggression against a socialist country or against a country that has already liberated itself from colonialism. Knowledge of it may well be one of the great deterrents to any such aggression in the future.

Peaceful Coexistence and Freedom

In no other period in history have the questions of peace and war, or of liberation struggles and attempted repression, been so prominent or so widely debated as at the present time. The debate has gone on within the bloc of imperialist countries, and it has gone on within the alliance of socialist countries.

These debates reflect the problems of a transition period from capitalism to socialism, when imperialism becomes more constricted and more desperate and when socialism and its allies become stronger and more confident. For imperialism the question is one of how or whether it can continue to use the force at its disposal to perpetuate itself. For the anti-imperialists it is a question of how to use their strength to free the world from the last remnants of colonialism and from whatever form of imperialist control, while opening the way to non-capitalist paths of development in peace.

Throughout the course of twenty years of "cold war" the peoples of the world have been confronted, by imperialism, with the immi-

nence of history's most terrible form of violence, nuclear warfare, but they have succeeded in preventing its use against themselves. At the same time, popular movements have not been intimidated by the nuclear power in the hands of imperialism and have conducted successfully every form of struggle, including armed struggle, to win independence and freedom.

Just and Unjust Wars

This general attitude toward war and struggle in the world today corresponds to the Communist view in regard to "unjust" and "just" wars. In this view, all wars that serve the interests of imperialism and of the small minority of exploiters who profit from aggression against any country or people are unjust wars that cannot be supported and must be opposed. On the other hand, wars or armed uprisings for liberation of an oppressed country or people are just wars, and should be supported.

It is essential, in present world conditions, to distinguish between the various wars that occur or that threaten to occur. First of all are world wars that involve large-scale conquest of foreign territory and of foreign markets and that must inevitably today become nuclear holo-

causts; these would include wars of the capitalist countries against the socialist countries. All wars of this kind are aggressive and are unjust wars.

A second type of war is the local or "brush fire" war, about which imperialism, especially American imperialism, has been building a whole new military theory. Even small nuclear weapons have been designed to be used in local wars, which are conceived of as being confined to a limited area to serve imperialist aims. An example of the local war was the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. Local wars of this kind, however, could easily spread to become major nuclear wars. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries intervened to halt the aggression against Egypt, and the imperialists involved, aware of the implications, withdrew; the local war was nipped in the bud. Local wars are also unjust wars, cannot be supported, and must be opposed.

The third kind of war in the world today, the war of national liberation, has begun usually as an uprising of colonial people against their oppressors. These are the wars in the modern era that have developed into guerrilla wars. Premier Nikita Khrushchev has pointed out, in defining this kind of war:

"There will be liberation wars as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists.

Wars of this kind are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only justified, but are inevitable, for the colonialists do not freely bestow independence on the peoples. The people win freedom and independence only through struggle, including armed struggle." (*World Marxist Review*, January 1961.)

Just wars of this kind occur, however, only under very specific circumstances in which the people concerned are left with no other alternative but this form of struggle, if they would be free. Embarked upon rashly, without the necessary conditions, it has led and can lead to unreasonable slaughter, particularly of those who have participated. Such wars arise totally from conditions within a country and cannot be an export from abroad.

In considering the question of unjust and just wars it should be kept in mind that a single war can be viewed as both unjust and just, depending on the side from which it is viewed. Thus a war of aggression conducted for predatory purposes, whether on a world-scale or in a local arena, is unjust in regard to the aggressor but can be just from the standpoint of those who resist it, if their aim is clearly for freedom and independence. All world wars have also not been totally unjust: the war against fascism from 1939-1945, which had the greatest world-wide proportions, was just on the part of those who fought for national liberation and for the defeat of aggression.

Socialism and War

As the transition from capitalism to socialism develops, and as the strength of the forces of socialism and anti-imperialism increases both economically and militarily, the question arises as to whether the Communist outlook on unjust and just wars does not imply that a final end could justly be brought to capitalism by military means.

Answers to this question have been provided in two major policy declarations endorsed by the world's Communist parties following international discussion of the problems of the transition period. The first of these was a Declaration and Peace Manifesto adopted in 1957; the second was a Statement of Communist parties from eighty-one countries agreed upon in Moscow in November 1960.

On both occasions the representatives of the assembled Communist parties unanimously and unequivocally put themselves on record in support of peace, in favor of peaceful coexistence of the two major social systems, and for the elimination of the weapons and military bases that threaten peace.

"War is a constant companion of capitalism," the Statement of 1960 declared. "The system of exploitation of man by man and the system of extermination of man by man are two aspects of the capitalist system. Imperialism has already inflicted two devastating world

wars on mankind and now threatens to plunge it into an even more terrible catastrophe. Monstrous means of mass annihilation and destruction have been developed which, if used in a new war, can cause unheard of destruction to entire countries and reduce key centers of world industry and culture to ruins. Such a war would bring death and suffering to hundreds of millions of people, among them people in countries not involved in it. Imperialism spells grave danger to the whole of mankind."

While pointing to imperialism as the cause of war today, the Statement answered the charge that the Communist movement is advanced through war:

"The imperialist reactionaries, who try to arouse distrust for the Communist movement and its ideology, continue to intimidate the people by alleging that the Communists need wars between states to overthrow the capitalist system and establish a socialist system. The Communist parties emphatically reject this slander. The fact that both world wars, which were started by the imperialists, ended in socialist revolutions by no means implies that the way to social revolution is necessarily through world war, especially now that there exists a powerful world system of socialism. Marxist-Leninists have never considered that the way to social revolution lies through wars between states.

"The choice of social system is the inalienable right of the people of each country. Socialist revolution cannot be imported, nor imposed from without. It is a result of the internal development of the country concerned, of the utmost sharpening of social contradictions in it. *The Communist Parties, which guide themselves by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, have always been against the export of revolution. At the same time they fight resolutely against imperialist export of counter-revolution. They consider it their internationalist duty to call on the peoples of all countries to unite, to rally all their internal forces, to act vigorously and, relying on the might of the world socialist system, to prevent or firmly resist imperialist interference in the affairs of any people who have risen in revolution.*" (Emphasis in original.)

The Statement recognized that "the aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed." It pointed out, however, that "real forces have appeared that are capable of foiling its plans of aggression. War is not fatally inevitable. Had the imperialists been able to do what they wanted, they would already have plunged mankind into the abyss of the calamities and horrors of a new world war. But the time is past when the imperialists could decide at will whether there should or should not be war . . . Experience shows that it is possible to combat effectively the local wars started by the imperialists,

and to stamp out successfully the hotbeds of such wars."

Two years after this Declaration was endorsed, the proof of this assertion received its most dramatic demonstration in the steps taken to prevent an invasion of Cuba in October 1962 by the aggressive sectors of American imperialism. The stand of the Soviet Union in this instance, placing itself resolutely at the side of Cuba with its missile strength, halted the mounting campaign of imperialist intervention in Cuba and contributed greatly to impressing upon American imperialists the permanence of the Cuban revolution.

Imperialism and the present-day war-makers can be halted in their schemes only by the firm and united stand of those opposed to aggression. Behind the Soviet Union and Cuba stood even greater forces that American imperialism was compelled to take into account. These forces were pointed out by the 1960 Statement:

"For the first time in history, war is opposed by great and organized forces: the mighty Soviet Union, which now leads the world in the decisive branches of science and technology; the entire socialist camp, which has placed its great material and political might at the service of peace; a growing number of peace-loving countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which have a vital interest in preserving peace; the international working class and its organi-

zations, above all the Communist parties; the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and dependent countries; the world peace movement; and the neutral countries which want no share in the imperialistic policy of war and advocate peaceful coexistence. The policy of peaceful coexistence is also favored by a definite section of the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries, which takes a sober view of the relationship of forces and of the dire consequences of a modern war. The broadest possible united front of peace supporters, fighters against the imperialist policy of aggression and war inspired by U.S. imperialism, is essential to preserve world peace. Concerted and vigorous actions of all the forces of peace can safeguard the peace and prevent a new war."

Frustration of Imperialist Aggression

The case of Cuba was not the only instance in which the strength of these peace forces has had to be taken into account by imperialism and has prevented both the commission of aggression and the extension of wars already started by imperialism. The first important instance was that of the Korean War, in which the desires of the most aggressive forces of American imperialism to expand the war and to strike at the allies of the people of North

Korea were frustrated and in which American imperialism for the first time was compelled to accept a peace without victory.

A second major case of the frustration of imperialist aggression occurred during the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel in 1956. Although the Egyptian army itself was defeated, the steps taken in support of the Egyptian people by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and by the forces for peace in general put an end to the war of intervention. President Dwight Eisenhower, in a letter to the British premier, Anthony Eden, urged in alarm the end of the intervention: "We must remember the resentment that force will produce everywhere, and even if Nasser were overthrown, we would be faced with the problem of guerrilla warfare." Further invasions planned for Syria and Iraq by the imperialists were averted by the same steps.

In January 1964 the people of Zanzibar ousted a neo-colonial regime in a brief armed revolt. British and American forces were prepared to intervene, as they would have done readily in the past days of gunboat diplomacy, and bloody fighting would have followed. No such intervention took place. The Soviet Union and the peace-loving newly independent countries of Africa warned against intervention and came to the support of the popular government of Zanzibar.

The dilemma of American imperialism in South Vietnam is a clear example of the combination of factors that is defeating imperialist intervention and desires to spread a war. First of all, intervention by American troops has had to be carried on under a screen of providing "advisors" to a puppet army, with the wholesale use of American troops considered "politically unwise" because of the protests it would bring both at home and abroad. Secondly, the guerrilla warfare conducted by the National Liberation Front has defeated all the "counter-insurgency" measures employed by imperialism, from the use of helicopters, chemical warfare, and other special weapons to the use of concentration camp "armed hamlets" for the population. Thirdly, the expressed desire of the more rabid wing of American imperialism, of winning in South Vietnam by spreading the war to all the liberated countries of Asia, is a realization of the tremendous encouragement given to the people of South Vietnam by the victories of the socialist countries and the national liberation movements elsewhere. At the same time the inability of American imperialism to carry out such a scheme is evidence of the strength of the forces of peace that make imperialism hesitate to embark on such aggression.

Wherever a liberation struggle occurs in the world today, it is favored by the existence

of powerful socialist countries and of anti-colonial liberated areas, by the world-wide peace movement, and by the realization of imperialism that it cannot expand a suppressive war without risking a total war of nuclear annihilation.

In Angola, the Portuguese imperialists, engaged in a suppressive war against the people of that colony who have taken up arms for freedom, find themselves confronting an aroused liberated Africa that comes to the aid of the Angolan guerrillas. In North Borneo, the British imperialists who are trying to suppress the liberation movement in Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah are confronted also by Indonesian "volunteers," who cross the border to aid their brothers. In South Africa, the brutal repression of the African majority under the apartheid policy has brought world-wide boycotts and sanctions, particularly from the African, Asian, and socialist countries, and avowals of direct aid for the Africans from the newly independent states to the north.

These are not efforts to provoke wars or to expand wars. They are efforts to bring a halt to violent methods of suppressing the aspirations of people for freedom, to put an end to policies that endanger the peace of whole regions. Africans in general recognize that the military suppression of one group endangers their own hardwon freedom and threatens the return of

a brutal colonialism for them. Indonesians know from experience that the consolidation of foreign military bases on their borders throws the shadow of imperialism again upon them. The people of Cambodia, of Laos, of North Vietnam, and China are fully aware of the menace to their freedom that is posed by an American army of intervention and suppression in South Vietnam.

Any effort, either moral or material, that is made to assist the liberation forces in these areas is based on a desire for peace (the only condition under which these peoples can develop) and on a desire to put an end to the unjust wars of imperialism.

National Liberation and Peace

The basic urge for peace that lies beneath all of the struggles for liberation in the colonial and semi-colonial areas is best seen in the policies that are adopted after liberation is attained. Non-alignment in the cold war, non-participation in any military blocs, non-interference in the affairs of other countries, demands for the removal of foreign military bases, endorsement of the idea of peaceful coexistence, full attention to peaceful economic and social development—these have been positions taken in almost all the newly independent countries

where freedom has been won by either armed or peaceful means.

In the cases where military alliances have been resorted to, as in the case of Cuba with the Soviet Union, these have come about because of the direct danger of intervention from counter-revolutionary forces organized by imperialists who seek to regain their domination. The Bandung Conference of Asian-African states and the Afro-Asian Solidarity conferences at Belgrade, Cairo, Moshi, and Algiers have all endorsed the principles of peaceful coexistence and of non-interference in the affairs of any country.

Typical of the outlook of newly liberated states was the resolution on general disarmament adopted at the Pan-African summit conference at Addis Ababa in May 1963, at which the Organization of African Unity was established. The resolution, approved by Algeria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and other countries that had won freedom through guerrilla warfare and other forms of armed struggle, read as follows:

"This summit conference of independent African states **HAVING CONSIDERED** all aspects of the questions of general disarmament;

"UNANIMOUSLY CONVINCED of the imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying their efforts to contribute to

the achievement of a realistic disarmament programme through the signing, by all states concerned, of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

"HAVE AGREED unanimously to concert their efforts and action in these various fields, and to this end have decided on the following measures:

"(1) To declare and accept Africa as a denuclearized zone, the banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the banning of the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

"(2) The destruction of existing nuclear weapons;

"(3) The removal of military bases from Africa and disentanglement of African countries from military pacts with foreign powers;

"(4) To appeal to the great powers to:

(i) reduce conventional weapons;

(ii) put an end to the arms race, and

(iii) sign a general and complete disarmament agreement under strict and effective international control.

"(5) To appeal to the great powers, in particular to the Soviet Union and the United States of America, to use their best endeavors to secure the objectives stated above;

"(6) To undertake, to bring about by

means of negotiation, the end of military occupation in the African continent, the elimination of military bases and nuclear tests which constitute an essential element of African independence and unity."

This position of the independent African states is fully subscribed to by the socialist countries. The 1957 Declaration by the assembled Communist parties of twelve socialist states said:

"The defense of peace is the most important world-wide task of the day. The Communist and Workers' Parties in all countries stand for joint action on the broadest possible scale with all forces favoring peace and opposed to war. The participants in the meeting declare that they support the efforts of all states, parties, organizations, movements and individuals who champion peace and oppose war, who want peaceful coexistence, collective security in Europe and Asia, reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use and tests of nuclear weapons."

Whenever the "cold war" period begins to break up and to give way to a time of relaxation of tensions in the major areas of world conflict, it will be due to the combination of an ever-stronger socialist system with the victories of national liberation movements in the regions once dominated by the imperialist powers. Every victory for colonial freedom,

whether gained through guerrilla struggle or through peaceful efforts, has diminished the arena in which imperialism can make war, and every gain for the socialist countries, in their economies and in technological development, has diminished the chances of an imperialist victory in a major war and therefore the chance of such a war occurring.

The concept of peaceful coexistence that has grown out of this situation is based on the realities of the world transition from capitalism to socialism. It is not a concept of pacifism; it is a concept of a situation in which the aggressors and war-makers can be restrained and prevented from forcing their system or their policies upon any people. As the unified Declaration of 81 Communist parties in 1960 pointed out:

"In conditions of peace, the socialist system increasingly reveals its advantages over the capitalist system in all fields of economy, culture, science and technology. The near future will bring the forces of peace and socialism new successes. The U.S.S.R. will become the leading industrial power of the world. China will become a mighty industrial state. The socialist system will be turning out more than half the world's industrial product. The peace zone will expand. The working class movement in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement in the colonies and depend-

encies will achieve new victories. The disintegration of the colonial system will become completed. The superiority of the forces of socialism and peace will be absolute. *In these conditions a real possibility will have arisen to exclude world war from the life of society even before socialism achieves complete victory on earth, with capitalism still existing in a part of the world.* The victory of socialism all over the world will completely remove the social and national causes of all wars."

Policies of Accommodation

In the past twenty years, history has provided imperialism all the necessary lessons in regard to colonial liberation movements. All of the imperialist powers have sought to prevent liberation, have tried to block colonial independence, and have sought to introduce new methods of control where independence has been achieved. The lessons to be derived from these efforts are clear: liberation movements cannot be stamped out, the forces for independence cannot be blocked for long, and neo-colonial methods are soon exposed and resisted.

Failure of Counter-Insurgency

Both France and Britain have been compelled to swallow these bitter truths and in a number of instances have abandoned attempts to suppress liberation movements when the cost has become too great and when more extensive losses were threatened. The acknowledgment by Britain in 1957 of "the winds of change" in Africa was a recognition of the danger and futility of opposing liberation move-

ments by force on that continent. Neither of these imperialist powers has given up its efforts to maintain its economic interests by other means in areas where it formerly had complete control, but each has shown a tendency to come realistically to terms with people determined to win freedom through armed or otherwise militant struggles.

Today, unfortunately, the bulk of the imperialist forces in the United States still continue to ignore these lessons and experiences. Not only did they encourage, finance and supply the suppression wars of other imperialist powers in Asia and Africa, but they have persisted in carrying on ruthless interventionist policies of armed suppression even in countries where the other imperialist powers have been ready to come to a settlement with liberation forces. At the same time, in those areas long considered to be American imperialist preserves (such as Latin America) they have adamantly refused to acknowledge the popular demands for change. As a consequence, throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, the United States imperialists have come to be viewed as the main enemy of all the colonial and underdeveloped peoples.

Furthermore, the tendency of American imperialism to move in and to elbow out its own imperialist allies in areas where their interests have been weakened or defeated by liberation

struggles (as in Southeast Asia or in Africa) has brought sharp divisions in the imperialist alliances.

These stubborn and rapacious policies on the part of American imperialism have brought the prestige of the United States to the lowest point in its history. The attempt to solve its problems of investments and markets by military means and by the crude murderous methods of "special forces" and of the CIA have only served to increase its troubles and to isolate it in the world.

In the days when imperialism was an expanding force and when the countries that came under its heel were unprepared to liberate themselves, force was the knife that carved out empires and that decapitated resistance. When the days of colonialism have become numbered, however, the opposite is the case: the use of force energizes resistance and encourages people to use force to win their freedom.

This fact has been recognized, to a degree, by France and Britain, which, after bitter experience, have gone through the process of retreating from open colonial and armed suppression techniques to more subtle neo-colonial methods. In the case of U.S. imperialism, however, a curious reverse trend has shown itself: whereas American imperialism was the perfecter of neo-colonial techniques and ruled more

by "dollar diplomacy" than by "gunboat diplomacy" in the past, it has today dropped this mask and resorted to armed suppression to maintain itself.

Policy makers in imperialist circles in the United States have failed to understand the deep-seated significance of these developments. If neo-colonialism with its largely hidden techniques has become less viable even in a region like Latin America, the long-time stronghold of "dollar diplomacy," then methods of counter-insurgency and of military dictatorship, far from stabilizing a situation, will drive home even more clearly to the people the colonial nature of their circumstances and will arouse them to participate in anti-imperialist liberation movements. It is for this reason that attempted intervention in Cuba has stirred a fierce defense of the Cuban revolution throughout Latin America and has brought the fires of anti-imperialist feeling (that have for long smouldered below ground) flaming to the surface. It is for this reason that the use of American troops to quell a demonstration in a country like Panama now brings on a national outburst of anti-imperialist anger.

It is a tragic illusion for imperialist policy makers to think that, after a period of counter-insurgency techniques to suppress popular movements, the good old days of "good neighbor" imperialism can be restored in Latin America, or that "normal" colonial relation-

ships will return to Southeast Asia. The imposition of the imperialist system at gunpoint in this stage of world history can only lead to a state of permanent military occupation or military suppression, from the imperialist standpoint, with endless colonial wars conducted by people to whom the reasons for poverty, misery and national frustration will now have become utterly clear.

After seven years of counter-insurgency intervention by American troops in South Vietnam, the most optimistic of imperialist civilian and military leaders in the United States spoke early in 1964 of the need for "ten years or more" of military suppression merely to achieve a situation of stalemate with the guerrillas of the Liberation Front. At that point the effort was costing \$1,500,000 per day, and any further use of American troops, beyond the 18,000 then committed, would send the costs soaring. The application of such policies in Latin America and in Africa wherever national liberation movements come to maturity would mean conducting at a dozen points major colonial wars of "ten years or more" with no hope of real victory in any of them, a prospect so appalling that no military leader or politician can face it without being profoundly shaken or driven to wild outbursts of frustration.

The most unreasoning of these outbursts have proposed the nuclear bombing of socialist

countries to eliminate the "centers" and the "sources" of national liberation struggles. This type of proposal, aside from the falsity of its premise, is, to put it mildly, akin to suggesting that one jump out of a window to stop the bleeding of a finger. Not only would it result in the nuclear devastation of the imperialist countries themselves, but it would not in any way deter the national liberation struggles, which would spread to all areas. The same is true of the proposal to attack North Vietnam in order to suppress guerrillas in South Vietnam, or to attack Cuba in order to prevent liberation forces from developing in Brazil or in Venezuela. This is the "Bay of Pigs" insanity blown up to global size, and its inevitable failure would be on such a grand scale that it would shake the existing order in the United States down to its roots.

American imperialism has embedded itself in this difficult and unrealistic situation because it has ignored the lessons of the great armed struggles for liberation that have swept the colonial regions in the modern period, because it has ignored the basic causes of such struggles and their necessary solution, and because it ignores the fact that the entire theory of counter-insurgency applied under those conditions merely creates the favorable circumstances for widespread guerrilla-type liberation movements.

Once mired in colonial wars without victory, imperialist policies of counter-guerrilla action, inflexible from the outset, tend to become even more rigid, due to their enhancement of the role of imperialist military and political circles at home. Only the fascist-minded army officer and the most reactionary civilian administrator will carry out such policies with the ruthlessness that they involve, and these elements become entrenched in leadership. The propaganda and the political atmosphere needed to drum up popular support for suppressive policies gives full leeway for the most reactionary political forces to emerge, to strengthen themselves, and to permeate the political life of the nation. In the United States, the John Birch Society, the "radical right," and the right-wing Goldwater movement have been the direct result and the beneficiaries of the counter-revolutionary policies abroad. They would extend these policies along the line of even more insane adventures and interventions, and make extrication difficult even when all rationality points to it.

Search for Alternatives

The bankruptcy of suppression policies and the increasing realization that the whole concept of "special forces" and their operations is invalid because the people in the countries

where they are employed are not with the United States and are turning ever more to anti-imperialist leadership has brought about a search for alternatives by wiser elements in the United States. This came to the surface in March 1964 when Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the key Senate Foreign Relations Committee, delivered a significant speech urging adjustment of United States foreign policy to a changed world situation.

"We are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation, and we are not adapting ourselves to it. We are clinging to old myths in the face of new realities," he said. Among the realities that he urged to be accepted was that of Cuba, calling for "the acceptance of the continued existence of the Castro regime as a distasteful nuisance but not an intolerable danger."

In the same month, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson added their advocacy of a changed set of policies. Mansfield raised the question of withdrawal from the bloody mire of intervention in South Vietnam. As ultra-reactionary Americans called for an extension of the war to the other liberated countries of Asia, Mansfield said that "there is no national interest at this time which would appear to justify this conversion. The possibilities of neutralization may be extremely difficult

to realize, but they ought not to be dismissed out of hand." Stevenson asserted that "as anyone willing to see clearly already knows, the current course of world affairs calls for something more than a 'policy of containment.' . . . I would suggest that the central trend of our times is the emergence of what might be called a policy of cease fire and peaceful change . . ."

The development of a marked differentiation of policy within the upper political circles of American leadership has in no way implied a willingness on the part of any of them to abandon imperialist aims of exploiting countries in a colonial fashion or of trying to thwart the rise of independent governments that want to solve national problems in their own ways. To the more clear-sighted of the imperialists it has become evident that harsh tactics of suppression merely serve to bring the most uncompromising and most determined elements into the leadership of liberation struggles. They have become aware that the "counter-guerilla" tactics of armed suppression and the interventionist "special forces" sabotage tactics in liberated countries are doomed to failure and can only result in a complete sweeping away of United States imperialist interests if they continue to be pursued.

To the Fulbrights, the Mansfields and the growing number of those imperialists for whom they speak, it has become wholly real-

istic to work out an accommodation with the forces of national liberation in areas where they can no longer be controlled, in the hope that investments and markets can be preserved albeit under changed relationships. Liberation movements and anti-imperialists in general have no illusions that this represents a change in the nature of imperialism. It is essentially a desire on its part to return to the more subtle methods of neo-colonialism and to foster the conditions under which compromising leaders and forces would come to the fore in the colonial and underdeveloped countries.

Whatever the orientation of the "realistic" sectors among the imperialists, any shift from armed suppression and intervention to negotiation and accommodation with liberation forces can only be viewed as a defeat for aggressive imperialism and its attempts to reverse revolutionary changes in the world by means of force. It would mean that, in the effort to save themselves from a complete debacle, the imperialists would be compelled to adopt certain of the positions advocated by the present-day peace movement, a tendency that would strengthen the movements for peace and democracy in the United States and would give a major setback to the ultra-reactionary war-making wing of imperialism.

The question of whether the peoples of the world who have long suffered under colonial

conditions will gain their freedom and will maintain it by peaceful means depends largely on the attitude of the imperialists, in particular the imperialists of the United States. Twenty years of liberation struggles have proven that the people do not hesitate to use all possible means, when necessary, to end their subjugation to imperialist rule, and that the "new" military theories of "limited wars," "brush fire wars," or "special operations" are bankrupt and are leading the imperialist countries into one crisis after another.

An adjustment by United States imperialism to the realities that now confront it in all parts of a world that is undergoing the drastic changes that accompany the transition from capitalism to socialism would increase the possibility for that transition to be accomplished in a relatively peaceful manner. The struggle between colonialists and anti-colonialists, between imperialists and anti-imperialists, between imperialism and the forces of socialism would continue bitterly on all fronts, but the likelihood would be greater that it would involve other forms of struggle, less costly and more peaceful, than the guerrilla warfare that has featured the contemporary period.

WILLIAM J. POMEROY

GUERRILLA AND COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

What is the theory of counter-insurgency—its history and its aims? Can the U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam or elsewhere solve the problems raised by people seeking national liberation and independence? The author, who himself was a participant in a people's guerrilla war, seeks to answer these and similar questions against the background of guerrilla experience in American history and particularly in relation to liberation wars in the present period.

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